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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
After the Gulf War in 1991, United Nations (UN) Security 
Council Resolution 687 demanded that Iraq completely 
disarm of nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) weapons 
and infrastructures, as well as ballistic missiles with a range in 
excess of 150 kilometres. The United Nations Special 
Commission (UNSCOM) was set up to assess Iraq's 
compliance with these requirements in the areas of chemical 
and biological weapons and ballistic missiles. According to 
Resolution 687, Iraq was obliged to disarm in a manner that 
could be confirmed by UNSCOM. Moreover, once the 
disarmament had been completed UNSCOM would monitor 
Iraq's continued compliance with the disarmament 
obligations. A monitoring system would be set up to ensure 
that Iraq did not try to rebuild proscribed capabilities. Both 
elements - disarmament and monitoring - were necessary to 
ensure that Iraq remained completely disarmed of the 
proscribed weapons and infrastructures. However, in 1998 
UNSCOM left Iraq without having been able to confirm that 
Iraq had completely disarmed of chemical and biological 
weapons (CBW), ballistic missiles (BM) with a range of more 
than 150 km, and the infrastructures used to produce these 
weapons. 
In December 1998 the Security Council's consensus on how 
to respond to Iraq broke down. This breakdown, and the 
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resulting inability to reinstate a disarmament and monitoring 
regime in Iraq after 1998, was rooted in opposing views on 
whether the Iraqi regime and the unresolved disarmament 
issues posed a threat to international security. These 
differences were manifested in the split that emerged in the 
Security Council over the future of the disarmament and 
monitoring regime in Iraq. China, Russia and France 
proposed that a monitoring agency ought to replace 
UNSCOM, while the United States and Britain argued that the 
new agency had to focus on both disarmament and 
monitoring. There were significant political and technical 
differences berween these two activities. Disarmament focused 
on ensuring the destruction of existing Iraqi chemical and 
biological weapons and proscribed missiles, along with the 
infrastructures used to develop and make these weapons. 
Monitoring was intended to ensure that Iraq did not acquire 
or rebuild CBW or proscribed BM infrastructures. The 
opposing factions in the Security Council disagreed on 
whether it was possible to monitor to ascertain whether Iraq 
stayed disarmed unless all remaining disarmament questions 
had been resolved. However, the breakdown of the Council's 
consensus meant that UNSCOM inspectors never returned to 
Iraq. 
The concerns about remaining disarmament issues later 
changed dramatically. After the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001, the George W. Bush administration cast the 
unsolved Iraqi disarmament issues and the possibility that Iraq 
could have resumed proscribed weapons production after 
1998 in terms of a threat of global proportion. The focus on 
international terrorism lowered the threshold for what 
capabilities were considered to pose a threat to international 
security. As a result of changes in the United States' threat 
perception, the question whether Iraq had or was able to 
acquire nuclear, chemical or biological weapons returned to 
the centre stage of international politics in 2002. 
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This renewed focus on the unresolved disarmament issues in 
Iraq revived the UN disannamenr process, and with the 
passing of Security Council Resolution 1441 a new inspection 
process was initiated. UNSCOM's successor organization, the 
United Nations Monitoring and Verification Commission 
(UNMOVIC), was sent to Iraq in order to assess whether Iraq 
would make use of this 'final opportunity to comply with its 
disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the 
Council'.' UNMOVIC stayed in Iraq between 27 November 
2002 and 18 March 2003, when all UN staff were withdrawn 
due to the impending war. An international coalition heavily 
dominated by American and British troops then attacked Iraq, 
arguing that Iraq since 1991 had retained stockpiles of 
chemical and biological weapons, that Iraq was acquiring 
more of these weapons and that the Saddam Hussein regime 
was pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. However, after 
the war the coalition's search team, the Iraq Survey Group 
(ISG), first led by David Kay and subsequently Charles 
Duelfer, has concluded that no large storages of chemical or 
biological weapons have been found. No unequivocal 
evidence that such weapon-production, or a nuclear weapons 
programme, had been reinitiated after UNSCOM left in 1998 
has been found. Although Iraq had undertaken a number of 
activities with the aim of developing missiles of proscribed 
ranges since 1998, none of these projects included efforts to 
develop warheads for chemical or biological weapons.' 
The UN disarmament and monitoring process between 
1991 and 1998 had led to substantial destruction of Iraq's 
biological and chemical weapon arsenals, as well as the 
destruction of the known infrastructure for development and 
production of nuclear, biological and chemical warfare 
capabilities. UNSCOM's disarmament achievements had a 
long-lasting impact shaping Iraq's prospect of rebuilding CBW 
1 Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002). 
'Charles Dueller (2004b). 
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capabilities after 1998, although it is not yet clear what 
UNSCOM's exact impact was in relation to other political 
and economic factors. Several questions about what happened 
in Iraq between 1998 and the war in 2003 remain 
unanswered. Because of what is now known about 
UNSCOM's impact, it is increasingly argued that the UN 
disarmament and monitoring effort, which was down played 
and underestimated in American and British pre-war 
assessments, was more effective than many had believed prior 
to the war in 2003.' 
This study will examine what the UN sought to achieve in 
Iraq between 1991 and 1998, UNSCOM's role in the 
disarmament regime and its achievements, and the unsolved 
disarmament issues that emerged in this process. The UN-led 
disarmament effort will be analysed for two main reasons, 
both related to current challenges. 
First, the case of UNSCOM played an important role in 
debates leading to the war in 2003. Prior to the war in 2003, 
the United States and Britain downplayed UNSCOM's 
achievements in accounting for Iraq's disarmament and the 
impact of the UN disarmament process on Iraqi capabilities. It 
now seems that several claims made by the United States 
deputy secretary for defence Paul Wolfowitz and vice-
president Dick Cheney about the limitations of what UN 
inspections could possibly achieve were wrong. Because of the 
role of these claims in the process leading to war in 2003, it is 
necessary to learn the appropriate lessons from the UNSCOM 
expenence. 
Second, the UNSCOM experience points to the possibilities 
and inherent limitations of enforced chemical and biological 
weapons (CBW) disarmament. An examination of 
UNSCOM's experience in Iraq can improve our 
understanding of what can be achieved in terms of disarming 
a sovereign country of such weapons and capabilities. The 
'.Joseph Cirincione et al. (2004); Daryl G. Kimball (2003). 
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lessons thus learned can be applied beyond the specific case of 
Iraq. By improving our understanding of the crucial variables 
in the case of Iraq, the factors that define the possibilities for 
successful NBC disarmament can be appreciated in different 
contexts. 
* =~ =~ 
Within this general framework, this study will examine three 
sets of main questions. The first set of questions focuses on the 
implications of the wide-ranging objective of complete NBC 
disarmament, defined in Security Council Resolution 687, for 
the UN disarmament regime that was set up in Iraq. To what 
extent was it possible to achieve complete NBC disarmament 
in Iraq? Furthermore, what is 'complete' NBC disarmament, 
and how could this be achieved and measured in the case of 
Iraq? The cease-fire resolution required Iraq to fully comply 
with the objectives of the disarmament regime in terms of 
completely disarming of the specified weapon categories, and 
at the same time fully cooperate with UNSCOM's accounting 
and monitoring of Iraq's disarmament. In light of these 
demands, what was the impact of Iraq's incomplete 
cooperation on UNSCOM's accounting for Iraqi compliance 
with Resolution 687? One consequence associated with Iraq's 
incomplete cooperation were the unresolved disarmament 
issues that came to play a central role in the casus belli of the 
coalition that went to war on Iraq in 2003. What was the 
nature of these unresolved issues, how did they emerge in the 
disarmament accounting process, and what was their impact? 
The second set of questions concerns the nature of the 
disarmament regime that was set up after the Gulf War. The 
design of the disarmament process, and UNSCOM's role 
within it, suggests that the disarmament regime was a 
'technical fix' applied to an essentially political problem. 
\Vhat were UNSCOM's prospects of success given d1e political 
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nature of this disarmament regime and its objectives? What 
impact did UNSCOM have on the disarmament process in 
light of the decisive role of the main political actors- Iraq and 
the Security Council? The UN disarmament regime in Iraq has 
generally been considered a technical success but a political 
failure. However, to what extent is it feasible to distinguish 
between political and technical aspects when assessing the 
disarmament regime in Iraq and its outcomes? 
The third set of questions concerns the role UNSCOM 
played in the 'containment' of Iraq, a political strategy that 
emerged in the United States after it was clear that Saddam 
Hussein's regime would survive the defeat in the 1991 Gulf 
War. Could the threat that Saddam Hussein's regime could 
pose by deploying NBC weapons be contained by the 
disarmament and non-proliferation regime? What was the 
impact of the US 'containment' strategy on the UN 
disarmament regime? 
*** 
The first chapter will focus on the evolution of Iraqi NBC 
programmes and the responses to those developments at the 
international level up to the Gulf War in 1991. The second 
eh a pter will examine the background for creating a UN 
disarmament regime in Iraq after the Gulf War, the process of 
setting up UNSCOM, and provide an overview over the main 
developments between 1991 and December 1998. The third 
chapter will focus on UNSCOM's mandate of accounting for 
all Iraq's destroyed weapons and capabilities as well as 
monitoring Iraq's compliance with the disarmament objectives 
in the future. In the fourth chapter, UNSCOM's achievements 
in accounting for Iraqi disarmament will be assessed, while the 
following fifth chapter will consider UNSCOM's monitoring 
of Iraq to ensure that prohibited capabilities were not retained 
or re-established. The sixth chapter will consider how 
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UNSCOM adapted to the working conditions in Iraq, as these 
conditions differed from what had been expected when 
UNSCOM's mandate was designed in 1991. The seventh 
chapter will examine the unsolved disarmament issues that 
remained when UNSCOM was evicted from Iraq in 1998. 
Finally, the conclusion will summarize the main points of the 
analysis. 
Summary of conclusions 
It will be argued that UNSCOM's effort to account for Iraq's 
disarmament raised a number of questions about how to 
define the scope of 'complete' disarmament. In the case of Iraq 
1991-98 the disarmament effort focused on destroying 
'hardware' (weapons and items specifically designed or 
imported for proscribed pnrposes). While this definition 
enabled UNSCOM to define a nnmerical target against which 
the disarmament 'sum total' conld be measnred, it did not 
include anything that could feasibly contribute to proscribed 
activities. Thus, even 'complete' disarmament would not be 
irreversible, as the risk that the proscribed capabilities could 
be rebuilt (by drawing on existing know-how and diverting 
'dual-capable' items from civilian undertakings) remained. 
The case of UNSCOM and Iraq illustrated the difficulties in 
deciding on the scope of 'complete' disarmament, and the 
balance that has to be struck between reducing the risk that 
the proscribed capabilities are not rebuilt and the disarming 
country's national secnrity capabilities, industrial and socio-
economic development. 
Because the disarmament regime was an attempt to apply a 
'technical fix' (verifying Iraq's complete disarmament of 
proscribed weapons and items) in order to remove the threat 
Iraq posed to international security, UNSCOM faced a 
number of challenges in converting this political objective into 
technical definitions, assessments and benchmarks. The 
attempt to depoliricise the disarmament accounting process 
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was quickly undermined once UNSCOM commenced its 
efforts in Iraq. UNSCOM was designed to account for Iraq's 
disarmament in purely technical terms. However, political 
decisions in Iraq and the Security Council shaped the 
disarmament accounting as well as the prospect of successfully 
achieving (and accounting for) 'complete disarmament'. Iraq's 
limited cooperation resulted in substantial politicisation of 
UNSCOM and its task. This politicisation had implications 
for UNSCOM's actual undertakings, as the chairman had to 
diplomatically engage with Iraq and other Security Council 
members to ensure the agency's ability to perform its task, and 
ultimately served to undermine the disarmament regime's 
credibility. This politicisation also contributed to the 
premature discontinuation of UNSCOM and its efforts after 
Operation Desert Fox in December 1998. Notwithstanding 
the impact of the politicisation on UNSCOM and its efforts, 
the agency served a crucial role in the disarmament regime by 
clarifying the commitment of Iraq and the Council to achieve 
the objective of complete disarmament of CBW and 
proscribed BM. 
Finally, concerning the disarmament regime's role in the US 
policy of containing the potential threat from Iraq, it will be 
argued that UNSCOM was able to ascertain that Iraq was not 
retaining or rebuilding proscribed weapons or capabilities that 
could pose a threat to international security. As long as the 
Security Council was perceived to be committed to the 
objective of complete disarmament the OMV system could 
serve as a deterrent against Iraqi efforts to rebuild proscribed 
capabilities. However, disagreement in the Security Council 
concerning when the sanctions regime could be lifted 
weakened the credibility of the disarmament regime and 
ultimately dissuaded Iraq from cooperation with UNSCOM. 
:~ :~ * 
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This study of the case of UNSCOM and Iraq identifies two 
crucial variables in the effort to verify complete CBW and BM 
disarmament, the first set concerning the relation between the 
disarming country and the auditing agency whereas the 
second relates to other countries' perception of this process 
and its outcomes. 
The first set of variables consists of the level of cooperation 
from the disarming country in allowing an external agency to 
confirm disarmament, and the auditing agency's ability to 
independently assess claims made by the disarming country. 
The agency's mandate of accounting for all of Iraq's 
proscribed programmes, weapons and items required Iraq to 
submit complete declarations that were audited by UNSCOM. 
However, wide-ranging capabilities to investigate omissions 
and misleading statements in those declarations enabled the 
agency to uncover information tl1at Iraq sought to withhold. 
Thus, the level of cooperation from the disarming country and 
scrutinizing auditing to ascertain the scope of the country's 
compliance with the disarmament objectives are variables that 
define how much confidence can be held in the impact of the 
disarmament process. 
The second variable, whose importance was clearly 
demonstrated after 1995 in the case of UNSCOM and Iraq, 
concerns the level of confidence held by other countries as to 
whether the disarming country is in fact committed to 
disarmament. Between 1991 and December 1998, UNSCOM 
verified substantial disarmament in Iraq. However, a number 
of unresolved disarmament accounting issues prevented 
UNSCOM from reporting that Iraq had 'completely' 
disarmed. Although there were a number of different reasons 
why these issues emerged, which would not be unexpected in 
any accounting effort at a nation-wide level, these issues 
introduced significant uncertainties into the disarn1a1nent 
accounting. Because of Iraq's demonstrated efforts to retain 
proscribed weapons, items and capabilities, several countries 
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perceived the uncertainties as manifesting Iraq's intentions to 
retain other weapons and items. 
In the case of UNSCOM and Iraq, decreasing confidence in 
Iraq's intentions to disarm had crucial implications for the 
disarmament regime and the subsequent war in 2003. The 
Security Council was unable to agree whether Iraq continued 
to pose a risk to international security. The Council's inability 
to agree whether Iraq posed a threat in these terms, and the 
mounting concerns of United States and Britain leading to the 
military operation known as Operation Desert Fox in 
December 1998, caused the premature withdrawal of 
UNSCOM from Iraq. 
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Chapter 2 
Iraq's CBW programmes and 
international responses prior to 
1991 
UNSCOM uncovered iuformation that was unknown to the 
outside world about the scope and achievements of the Iraqi 
CBW programmes. It then became clear that Iraq's CBW 
programmes were far more advanced and extensive than what 
was believed before the Gulf war in 1991. However, there are 
still unsolved questions that limit our understanding of the 
origin, evolution and military purposes of these programmes. 
The early stages of Iraq's interest in CBW capabilities and 
the emergence of Iraq's own CBW programmes were 
influenced by the regime's perception of its role in the Middle 
East, and especially Iraq's relations with Iran and Israel. It is 
generally believed that Saddam Hussein played an important 
role in the evolution of Iraq's efforts to acquire chemical and 
biological warfare capabilities. 
Iraq's pursuit of chemical weapons 
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) has traced the origins of Iraq's 
interest in chemical warfare capabilities to the early 1960s, 
and the Iraq Chemical Corps was established in 1964.4 The 
ISG report places the initial stages of Iraq's CW considerably 
4 Duelfer (2004b), Section 3: Iraq's Chemical warfare program, p. 5. 
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earlier than previous assessments. UNMOVIC, UNSCOM's 
successor organization, assessed that Iraq's CW programme 
was initiated in 1968 or 1969.5 Anthony Cordesman and 
Abraham Wagner have argued that Egypt's deployment of 
chemical weapons (CW) in Yemen between 1963 and 1967 
triggered Iraq's active interest in acquiring CW.' With regard 
to actual CW development activities, UNSCOM found 
evidence of Iraqi activities in this area dating back to the early 
1970s. Iraq's declaration to the UN in December 2002 stated 
that the Iraqi Chemical Corps began to build laboratories in 
1971 in order to synthesize small amounts of CW agents 
(Mustard, Tabun, and Tear Gas) for familiarization.' When 
Iraq started to establish indigenous CW facilities in the early 
1970's, other countries in the Middle East (Syria, Israel and 
Egypt) were also actively developing CW capabilities. 
Two key events appear to have had a clear impact on the 
Iraqi pursuit of CW warfare capabilities. First, the programme 
appears to have been shaped by lessons drawn from the 1973 
October war. Cordesman and Wagner argue that the October 
War sparked Iraqi interest in developing an indigenous 
offensive CW capability to match the Israeli and Egyptian 
chemical warfare capabilities." The second factor, the Iran-
Iraq war, became the catalyst for the increasing role of CW 
warfare for Iraq's security, and the resulting growth of Iraq's 
CW infrastructure. 
The Iran-Iraq war had a crucial impact on the role of CW 
in Iraqi strategic and tactical doctrines, deployment and 
production. Iranian allegations that Iraq had used CW 
emerged already in the opening stages of the war in 1980.9 
After the Iraqi army was forced to take defensive positions, 
CW began to be seen as the solution to cope with Iranian 
conventional superiority. 10 This led to the development of an 
'UNMOVJC (2003). 
'Anrhony Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner (1991); Dany Shoham 
(1998), p. 506. 
7 Duelfer (2004b), Section 3: Iraq's Chemical warfare program, p. 5. 
'Cordesman and Wagncr (1991), p. 507. 
9 Julian Perry Robinson and Jozef Goldblat (1984). 
1° Cordesman and Wagner (1991), p. 510. 
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industrial-scale, strategic chemical weapons programme, 
which was launched on 8 June 1981. This effort covered all 
stages from research to production and storage. Iraq began 
large-scale production of various chemical weapons agents, 
including nerve gas, and chemicalmunitions. 11 In this process, 
Iraq sought to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers by 
developing production of the chemicals necessary for making 
chemical weapons indigenously." The infliction of large 
casualties on the Iranian army and the weakening of Iranian 
morale that resulted from the use of CW were perceived as 
important achievements in countering the superior Iranian 
conventional capabilities. Iraqi leaders began to consider that 
CW could have a decisive impact on the outcome of the war. 13 
Iraq's systematic use of CW appears to have started after they 
were forced on the defensive, and took place mainly during 
1982-84 and 1986-88.14 During these years Iraq developed its 
expertise in chemical warfare. Iraq's use of the nerve agent 
Tabun against Iranian forces in 1984 was the first known case 
where this weapon (nerve agents are the most toxic of CW 
agents) has been used on the battlefield. 15 These experiences 
influenced the direction of Iraq's efforts to improve its CW 
capability, and led to an effort to create an infrastructure that 
could deliver CW for battlefield use. 
By the closing stages of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq had acquired 
an infrastructure producing large amounts of chemical agent 
that could be filled into munitions shortly before use. 16 Iraq 
accelerated its efforts in CW research and development, 
imported missile technology and equipment that could be used 
for chemical and biological agent production. 17 The ISG 
reported that Iraq weaponized the nerve agent VX in 1988, 
11 Duelfer (2004b), Section 3: Iraq's Chemical warfare program, p. 6. 
"Ibid., p. 8. 
° Cordesman and Wagner (1991), p. 506. 
"Ibid., pp. 513-17. 
15 Duelfer (2004b), Section 3: Iraq's Chemical warfare program, p. 9. 
1r, Cordesman and \'\'agner (1991); p. 506; author's interview with EkCus 
(2003 ). 
"The main overviews are UNSCOM (1999), UNMOVIC (2003), Duelfer 
(2004b). 
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and that Iraq dropped three aerial bombs filled with VX on 
Iran that year. 1" After the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, 
Iraq stopped CW production and focused on developing and 
refining their CW capabilities. However, CW production was 
restarted in 1990." 
Iraq's pursuit of biological weapons 
Iraq was most reluctant to provide UNSCOM information 
about its efforts to develop a biological warfare capability, 
and denied this effort until1995. Therefore, not much is 
known about Iraq's efforts and achievements in BW and the 
role of these weapons in Iraqi security doctrine. However, 
UNSCOM traced the earliest indication of an actual Iraqi BW 
programme back to 1974.20 It appears that these initial efforts 
did not lead to very much. However, following a 
reorganization in 1979, Iraq's BW research infrastructure was 
expanded. In 19 85 BW research was revitalized and focused 
on gas gangrene and botulinum toxin. 21 By the final stages of 
the Iran-Iraq war, a large infrastructure for BW agent 
production was being developed in Iraq. In 1986, a '5-year 
plan' was set up with the aim of weaponizing BW agents. In 
1987 the BW programme focused on the pursuit of large-scale 
production of BW agents. In the following year, a dedicated 
production plant, Al-Hakam, was set up." This facility 
developed an impressive production capability over the next 
couple of years. 
In 1990, prior to the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam's son-in-
law Hussein Kamel gave the order to weaponize BW agents as 
soon as possible." By the time of Desert Storm, Iraq was able 
to produce large quantities of anthrax, aflatoxin, botulinum 
ta Duelfer (2004b), Section 3: Iraq's Chemical warfare program, p. 33. 
"Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
'" UNMOVIC (2003). 
11 Duelfer (2004b), Section 1: Regime Strategic Intent, p. 28. 
"UNMOVIC (2003). 
23 Duelfer (2004b), Section 1: Regime Strategic Intent, p. 28. 
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toxin, and clostridium perfringens, as well as small quantities 
of ricin. Some of these agents were weaponizcd into missiles, 
aerial bombs, artillery shells, and aircraft spraytanks." What 
is known about Iraqi weaponization of BW agents suggests 
that by the time of the invasion of Kuwait, BW were intended 
to serve as retaliation weapons for deterrence purposes. 
Iraq did not fully succeed in developing a method of 
delivery that could unleash the potentially enormous lethal 
power of BW agents. UNSCOM later discovered that Iraq had 
filled BW agents into missile warheads and high altitude 
delivery bombs in 1990. On the eve of the Kuwait invasion, 
BW agents placed inside R-400 aerial bombs originally 
developed for delivering CW were deployed in Western Iraq. 
These were rather ineffective weapons in terms of their lethal 
yield, but if opponents feared that Iraq could retaliate with 
BW this could create a deterrent impact despite the poor 
quality of the BW weapons. 
CBW in Iraqi security and strategy 
Although Iraq has never fully disclosed its strategic rationales 
or tactical doctrines for CBW to the United Nations or the 
Iraq Survey Group, a number of statements made by Saddarn 
Hussein and senior Iraqis to UNSCOM, UNMOVIC and the 
ISG are informative. The ISG assessed that Saddam Hussein's 
rationale for developing NBC capabilities was based on 
concerns about national and regime survival as well as a 
desire for regional influence and prominence. 25 ISG further 
reports that Saddam Hussein considered NBC weapons as 
symbols and a consequence of modern statehood. More 
specifically, Iraq's development of CBW and BM programmes 
since 1988 appears to have been defined by Iraq's experiences 
in the Iran-Iraq war and its future regional ambitions. These 
" Ibid. 
"Ib"d ?4 1 'l p. - . 
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included warfighting capabilities, deterrence of hostile 
neighbours, control of internal opposition, and increasing 
Iraq's strategic influence in the Arab world." After the war in 
2003, Saddam Hussein and some of his senior officials still 
considered that chemical weapons and ballistic missiles had 
proved crucial for the regime's survival. First and foremost, 
this conclusion was based on lessons drawn from the Iran-Iraq 
war, but they also argued that the possibility that Iraq could 
retaliate with chemical weapons in response to a nuclear 
attack had deterred coalition forces from entering Baghdad in 
1991." 
The ISG report states: 'The former Regime viewed the four 
WMD areas (nuclear, chemical, biological, and missiles) 
differently. Differences between the views are explained by a 
complex web of historical military significance, level of 
prestige it afforded Iraq, capability as a deterrent or a coercive 
tool, and technical factors such as cost and difficulty of 
production.'" Chemical weapons were considered crucially 
important, based on their role in the Iran-Iraq war and in 
fighting internal enemies of the regime, and the strategic role 
they were to play against other conntries in the region. 
Similarly, ballistic missiles had played a crucial part in the 
Iran-Iraq war, particularly during the War of the Cities, and 
enabled Iraq's development of strategic CBW regional 
deterrent capabilities. However, the ISG report does not 
include new information on how the Iraqi regime viewed the 
strategic role and purpose of BW. 
The ways in which Iraq made use of its CBW warfare 
capabilities indicate that these served a number of roles in 
Iraqi security and strategy. By the end of the 1980s, Iraq's 
systematic and large-scale nse of CW against Iranian forces 
demonstrated that CW had served a central role for Iraqi 
"' Ibid. 
"Jb'd 73 d " 1 ., p.- an p . .).). 
"Ibid., p. 24. 
DIS.ll.RHING IRAQ? 23 
national security and military strategy in the war. It was likely 
that CW would continue to be important for Iraq's defence 
against an Iranian attack for the foreseeable future, as the 
superior numbers of the Iranian armed forces would remain a 
strategic challenge. Iraq's CB\V efforts were also dedicated to 
protecting the regime against 'internal enemies'. From the 
outset, elements of Iraq's CBW programmes appear to have 
been focused on developing poisons (e.g. cyanide and ricin) 
for clandestine activities, such as assassinations of enemies of 
the regime. 
Cordesman and Wagner have argued that there is evidence 
that Iraq used CW in campaigns against Kurdish villages 
between 1973 and 1975."' Iraq's widespread and systematic 
deployment of CW against its civilian population during the 
Iran-Iraq war was unprecedented."' Both the Iranian and the 
Iraqi regimes used chemical weapons against the Kurdish 
villages Halabjah and Dojaila on 26 February, 1988. For 
unclear reasons, an Iraqi mustard-gas attack was followed by 
an Iranian attack with the more poisonous hydrogen cyanide 
gas." Over 5000 Iraqi Kurdish civilians were killed." The Iraq 
Survey Group discloses that Iraq had dropped bombs filled 
with CW from helicopters on rebel groups in southern Iraq in 
early March 1991, while coalition forces were in the country. 
Hussein Kamel had originally ordered that the nerve agent VX 
should be used, but as this was not available Sarin and Tear 
Gas were used." 
By the end of the 1980s the Iraqi CW had acquired a 
central strategic role in Iraqi security. The demonstration of 
Iraq's CW warfare capabilities during the Iran-Iraq war had 
established a deterrent to Iraq's potential enemies in the 
Middle East. Saddam Hussein hinted at the possibility of 
1
'' Cordcsrnan and Wagner (1991), p. 506. 
'
10 Michael Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor {1995), p. 10. 
11 Cordesman and Wagner (1991), p. 517 . 
.1! Ibid. 
n Duclfer (2004b), Section 1: Regime Strategic Intent, p. 25. 
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using binary CW for retaliation purposes against Israel in a 
threatening speech delivered on 2 April 1990. Saddam 
Hussein stated: 'spare us your evil [ ... ]We do not need an 
atomic bomb. We have the dual chemical. Let them take note 
of this. We have the dnal chemical. It exists in Iraq'." This 
illustrates how Saddam Hussein sought to award a deterrent 
role to Iraqi chemical weapons at this point in time. 
One of the main purposes of Iraq's BW appears to have 
been to deter NW attacks by enabling Iraq to retaliate in 
response to such attacks- at least as long as Iraq was unable 
to retaliate 'in kind' with NW. Even though these weapons 
could not match the destructive power of NW, the fear and 
national disruption that would follow a BW attack could 
exercise a significant deterrent effect. After the Gulf war it was 
discovered that CBW had been deployed in western Iraq with 
delegated orders to be used in case Iraq was attacked by Israeli 
or American NW. 
The pursuit of an indigenous capability to develop and 
produce longer-range BM facilitated Iraq's development of a 
strategic retaliatory capability. In 1974 Iraq started to import 
surface-to-surface SCUD missiles with a range up to 300 km. 
Iraq then went on to modify some of those missiles, increased 
their range to 615 km in 1987, and then pursued indigenous 
development and production of engines for missiles with even 
longer ranges." The role of Iraqi missiles in the War of the 
Cities was considered to have been very important in the final 
stages of the Iran-Iraq war. However, the lessons from Iraq's 
difficulties in replacing missiles during this war led to Iraq's 
pursuit of indigenous ballistic missile production capabilities." 
J
4 Cited in Duelfcr (2004b), Section 2, cover page . 
., UNMOVIC (2003). 
-Jr. Duelfer (2004b), Section 2: Delivery Systems, p. 1. 
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International reactions before and after the Gulf 
War in 1991 
Prior to 1991, several countries suspected that Iraq was 
pursuing the development of CBW capabilities. After Iraq 
deployed CW in the Iran-Iraq war, it became obvious to the 
outside world that CW had obtained a central role in Iraqi 
security. Much less was known about Iraq's efforts in the area 
of BW. In 1988, western media wrote that United States 
intelligence agencies had uncovered Iraqi imports of 
equipment that could be used in a BW programme." 
However, such information did not reveal how far Iraq had 
progressed in their efforts to produce BW. In fact, Iraq was 
pursuing nuclear, biological and chemical weapon 
programmes despite having signed international non-
proliferation and disarmament treaties (the 1925 Geneva 
Convention, the 1970 Nuclear non-Proliferation Treatv and 
the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention).'" Even 
though the use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers 
and Kurdish villages was known outside Iraq, this did not 
cause significant problems for the Iraqi regime in the 
international community. Statements of concern by the 
Security Council were not backed by actions."' 
The inaction at the international level reflected the relatively 
low priority of CBW on the Cold War security agenda. 
During the Cold War Iraq's CBW programmes were mainly 
considered to be a regional problem with no obvious 
implications for international security. At the level of 
international politics, many countries in the Middle East and 
in the West were more concerned about the challenge of post-
revolutionary Iran than Iraq during the 1980s. Prior to the 
)";"jean E. Krasno and james S. Sutterlin (2003), p. 3. 
38 The Geneva Convention prohibits use of chemical and biological weapons 
in warfare. The Chemical Weapons Convention did not exist at that point, 
and this regime came. into force in 1997. 
·
19 Kmsno and Sutterlin (2003), p. 3. 
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invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein was not generally seen 
as the unreliable and aggressive leader he was considered after 
the invasion. Iraq's containment of Iran during the Iran-Iraq 
war had suited several countries in the West and in the Middle 
East. 
With the invasion of Kuwait, on 1 August 1990, this 
situation changed dramatically. The assumptions that had 
guided US policy on Iraq were proven fundamentally wrong 
by this invasion and the ensuing war. Prior to the Gulf war, 
the Bush administration's policy toward Baghdad was guided 
by two basic and related assumptions. The first was that 
Baghdad, having battled Iran to a standstill at great cost in 
lives and treasure, was a punch-drunk fighter who was tired 
of war and needed a respite to rebuild. Iraq would continue to 
update its arsenal of conventional weapons and try to develop 
weapons of mass destruction, but diplomatic coercion and 
subversion would the primary levers of power, not war. [ ... ] 
The second key assumption[ ... ] held that Saddam Hussein's 
behaviour could be moderated through diplomacy and by 
encouraging American companies to become involved in 
rebuilding Iraq. The idea was that Saddam Hussein would 
emerge as a ruthless but pragmatic leader that would deal 
with Washington out of self-interest.''' 
After the invasion of Kuwait, the American administration 
came to the conclusion that Saddam Hussein's regional 
ambitions could not be tackled through diplomatic means. 
The invasion created concerns in the United States that 
Saddam Hussein could destabilise the Middle East by 
launching new attacks on neighbouring countries. Two of the 
three countries that were most immediately threatened by 
Iraqi CBW, Israel and Saudi Arabia (the third being Iran), 
were important allies of the United States. The American 
administration feared that Saddam Hnssein might invade 
Saudi Arabia. The consequences for the global oil market 
"" Gordon and Trainor (1995), pp. 9-10. 
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would be of serious concern to the United States. If the West 
were to interfere with Saddam Hussein's apparently growing 
regional ambitions, their forces would have to face the risk 
that the Iraqi regime would order deployment of CBW on the 
battlefield. Because of the changed perspectives of the threat 
of Saddam Hussein's regime after the Kuwait invasion, the 
issue of Iraq's ::--JBC arsenals and programs was widely 
perceived as an important challenge to international security 
and stability when the subsequent Gulf War ended. 
The expectations in the United States of what would 
happen in Iraq after the defeat in the Gulf War had 
implications for the terms of the disarmament regime that was 
set up to cope with a potential future Iraqi threat. The Gulf 
War ended with Sad dam Hussein still in power, which made 
the challenge of coping with Iraqi CBW a pressing issue. It has 
been argued that the objective of 'undermining the post-Gulf 
war Saddam Hussein regime- an implicit goal of the allied 
military campaign- was contradicted by the impulse to 
withdraw, disengage, and avoid any military links to the 
insurgents.'" The frustration that was entailed by this sense of 
an 'incomplete ending' was reflected in comments made by 
President Bush two days after the cease-fire in 1991: 'I haven't 
yet felt this wonderfully euphoric feeling that many of the 
American people feel. [ ... ]I think it's that I want to see an 
end. And now we have Saddam still there- the man that 
wreaked this havoc on his neighbours. '42 The fact that Saddam 
remained in power after the Gulf War required that the 
challenge of Iraqi CBW be tackled as part of the cease-fire. 
When the Gulf War ended, the American administration 
believed that precision bombing had destroyed the main 
facilities of the Iraqi NBC programmes. Brent Scowcroft, 
President Bush's national security advisor, assessed that Iraq's 
non-conventional capability had been largely destroyed. It 
41 Ibid., P· XV. 
"Ib'd 1.,p.xv. 
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later turned out that this assessment substantially 
underestimated Iraqi capabilities. In addition, a number of 
Iraqi NBC facilities had escaped bombing. It is worth noting 
that despite the belief that Iraq's NBC facilities had been 
largely destroyed, the risk that Saddam Hussein could 
reconstruct those capabilities and once again threaten 
international stability was considered by the United States to 
require the establishment of a disarmament and monitoring 
regime. 
Changing threat assessments 
Within a decade, the assessments of the threat of Iraq's CBW 
changed from considering Iraqi CBW as a regional problem to 
ultimately a threat of global proportions. The assessments of 
the risk that Iraqi WMD posed to international security were 
interlinked with different countries' perception of Iraq's role 
in regional and international security more generally. Before 
the invasion of Kuwait, Iraqi CBW were considered a regional 
problem that mainly concerned Iran and Israel. Since 1991 
there have been significant changes in how countries have 
perceived the threat of Iraqi CBW. In 1991, the prospect of 
facing CBW in Iraq made the United States come to the 
conclusion that Iraqi CBW were not a regional problem 
confined to the Middle East. 
The invasion of Kuwait was seen to signal a more 
aggressive Iraq that could require interventions to other Iraqi 
invasions in the future. Therefore, Iraqi CBW were seen as a 
threat with international ramifications. This was 
demonstrated by the decision to set up the UN disarmament 
regime under Chapter 7 in the UN Charter, which made it 
clear that Iraq's NBC programmes were considered threats to 
international security. A decade later, the attacks on 
September 11, 2001, led to changes in how the George W. 
Bush administration viewed the threat of the remaining 
unsolved NBC disarmament issues in Iraq. The possibility that 
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international terrorists could acquire NBC weapons from Iraq 
changed the United States' threat assessment of Iraq to one of 
global proportions. 
Efforts to counter Iraq's pursuit of NBC prior to 
1991 
The threat assessments of CBW in the hands of the Iraqi 
regime during the Cold War are key for understanding the 
weak responses to Iraq's use of CW and development of NBC 
programmes at the international level prior the Gulf War. The 
relatively low concern about CBW held by the Cold War 
superpowers meant that there were few mechanisms in place 
that could deny Iraq the acquisition of CBW. At the time of 
UNSCOM's creation in 1991, the only international 
inspection regime in the area of non-proliferation of NBC 
weapons was run by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). 
While Iraq's nuclear efforts fall outside the scope of this 
report, the country's experience with the IAEA is important in 
order to understand Iraqi expectations of what an 
international inspection regime was capable of achieving. This 
experience also illustrates to what extent Iraq was able to hide 
information about large-scale programmes from the outside 
world by deceiving an international inspection regime. IAEA 
inspections were negotiated between Iraq and the IAEA, and 
conducted in sites designated for inspection on agreed dates in 
a consensual manner. The negotiated nature of the inspections 
in Iraq led to inspection procedures that were not sufficiently 
intrusive and scrutinizing to uncover clandestine nuclear 
weapons-related research and development. Saddam Hussein 
came to the conclusion that the IAEA's negotiated inspection 
procedures offered an opportunity to continue the 
development of a NW programme, while appearing to fulfil 
the requirements of the international community represented 
by the IAEA. 
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In 1974, Saddam Hussein approved a deception-by-
cooperation scheme that enabled Iraq to pursue a NW 
capability while the !AEA inspections could provide a false 
sense of security to other countries." In fact, the !AEA actively 
defended Iraq against accusations that Iraq had a NW 
programme. A former senior researcher in Iraq's NW research 
programme, Khidir Hamza, has argued that Iraq's 
membership in the IAEA justified Iraqi import of technology 
for developing nuclear energy. Iraq imported items that were 
used to develop a NW research programme." As long as these 
imports appeared to be intended for peaceful purposes, Iraq 
would be able to obtain resources that could be used to build 
a NW infrastructure. This consensual nature of the inspection 
regime, not least the predictability of when inspections would 
take place, significantly reduced the probability of detection. 
Even though suspicions grew in other countries, such as Israel, 
that Iraq was developing NW and CW, the terms of the !AEA 
regime did not enable more investigative inspections or 
punitive responses. Iraqi deception and manipulation of 
IAEA's confidence-building measures undermined the 
international inspection regime's effort to certify that Iraq was 
not developing NW. 
Signs that Iraq was developing a NW programme led to 
unilateral actions from countries in the region. Israeli 
intelligence had assessed that there was a NW-related weapon 
programme in the Osiraq facility. Israeli leaders felt 
threatened by the signs that Iraq was developing a NW 
capability. In September 1980, at the outset of the Iran-Iraq 
war, Israel encouraged Iran to bomb the Iraqi nuclear research 
reactor (Osiraq). The Iranians attacked the reactor in 
September 1980, but did not inflict particularly significant 
damages on the reactor." Israeli airplanes bombed and 
43 Paul Levenrhal and Sreven Dolley (2001). 
"Khidhir Hamza (1998). 
45 Federation of American Scientists: 'Osiraqff amrnuz I'. 
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destroyed Osiraq in June 1981." The Security Council 
condemned the strike.<' It was subsequently debated whether 
the Israeli action was self-defence, permitted under 
international law and the UN Charter, or whether the Israeli 
allegations of an Iraqi NW programme were not justified and 
the attack was therefore an act of aggression." 
Neither the IAEA nor the Israeli strike destroyed Iraq's 
ambition or efforts to develop NW. As argued above, the 
!AEA inspections did not deter Iraq from pursuing a NW 
capability. In fact, Iraq's IAEA membership appears to have 
made Iraq's acquisition of nuclear technology and equipment 
easier. As long as Iraq did not change its fundamental WMD 
policy, it was not possible for the Israeli destruction of Iraq's 
nuclear reactor in Osiraq to achieve irreversible impacts on 
Iraq's nuclear programme. It was difficult to identify facilities 
that were crucial 'nodes' in Iraq's WMD capabilities, and if 
these were destroyed by military strikes it would be possible 
to build new facilities. 
"' Ibid. 
"Freedman (2004), p. 9. 
~s Federation of American Scientists: 'Osiraqrfammuz 1'. 
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Chapter 3 
UNSCOM: Background, 
characteristics and overview 
The desire to award the UN a more central role in 
international security after the end of the Cold War led to the 
decision to put the Security Council in charge of Iraq's 
disarmament. After the Gulf War, the Security Council found 
Iraqi NBC programmes to constitnte a threat to international 
security. The disarmament regime that was established by the 
cease-fire agreement, Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), 
stands unique in the history of disarmament. A number of 
analysts agree with the United States vice president Dick 
Cheney in his description of this disarmament regime as 'the 
most intrusive system of arms control in history'. 49 
This was the first time that the UN set up a country-specific 
NBC disarmament regime. It signalled a more general change 
in how the Security Council considered the threat of NBC 
weapons. On 31 March 1992, a Security Council summit 
meeting issued a statement defining for the first time NBC 
weapons proliferation as a threat to international peace and 
security.-"1 Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War enabled the Security 
Council to formulate a widely encompassing set of 
49 George A. Lopez and David Cortwright (2004), p. 92. 
50 UNSC Declaration 011 Disarmament, Arms Control and \Veapons of Mass 
Destructiou (1992); Yale Oral History Project interview with Hannay, p. 
24. 
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disarmament objectives, demand complete Iraqi cooperation, 
and give UNSCOM the ability to critically assess Iraqi 
compliance with these demands, as part of the cease-fire 
agreement (Security Council Resolution 687). 
UNSCOM: designed to disarm? 
The disarmament regime comprised two assessment agencies 
and the Security Council. Security Council Resolution 687 
(1991) defined the objectives of the disarmament regime and 
UNSCOM's role in the disarmament process. This resolution 
obliged Iraq to destroy all NBC weapons and ballistic missiles 
with a range of more than 150 km, associated items and 
production facilities used to produce or develop these 
weapons. Even though the extent of Iraq's efforts and 
achievements in the areas of BW and NW were not known at 
the time, the resolution was formulated in order to ensure that 
it would cover all three areas:" Iraq's disarmament would be 
audited ('verified') by UNSCOM and the IAEA who reported 
to the Security Council. The Security Council would determine 
whether or not Iraq could be declared 'completely' disarmed. 
UNSCOM had to account for Iraq's destruction of any 
existing CBW and the associated infrastructures, and oversee 
that Iraq only made BM of ranges below 150 km. However, 
simply destroying the existing proscribed infrastructures did 
not suffice to remove the NBC-based risk from Iraq in the 
long term because the destroyed capabilities could later be re-
established. Some equipment and resources used in various 
civilian industries or research facilities (e.g. breweries and in 
vaccine production) could be diverted to enable CBW 
production. Moreover, Iraq was allowed to make BM with a 
range below 150 km so it would be able to defend itself 
against attacks. This inherently enabled Iraq to make missiles 
with a range over 150 km. The risk that legal activities could 
H Yale Oral History Project interview \Vith Hannay, p. 4-5. 
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be diverted for proscribed purposes had to be managed in 
order to ascertain that Iraq stayed disarmed. A long-term 
monitoring system would be set up to confirm that this risk 
did not become a threat to international security in the future. 
This system would enable UNSCOM to detect Iraqi attempts 
to rebuild parts of CBW infrastructures or produce BM of 
proscribed ranges. By facilitating oversight to the international 
community over whether Iraq reconfigured equipment used in 
civilian undertakings to produce CBW, the monitoring system 
played an important role as a potential confidence-building 
tneasure. 
The Security Council offered Iraq a combination of 'carrots' 
and 'sticks', designed to persuade Iraqi leaders to disarm 
despite their likely reluctance to abolish the proscribed 
weapons and associated production capabilities. Resolution 
661 (1990) had implemented sanctions limiting Iraqi export 
and import to persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. After 
the Gulf War, most of these sanctions were retained in 
Resolution 687 as means to persuade Iraq to comply with the 
cease-fire conditions. Full Iraqi compliance with the 
disarmament objectives would result in the Security Council's 
decision to lift the wide-ranging ban on trade with Iraq. This 
offered Iraq a strong economic incentive to comply with the 
disarmament objectives. If Iraq failed to comply with the 
objective of complete NBC disarmament or refused to 
cooperate with UNSCOM, this would constitute a 'material 
breach' of the cease-fire terms. If the Security Council found 
Iraq to be in material breach, this would revert the situation to 
that prior to the cease-fire resolution, and open for the use of 
military force under Chapter 7 in the UN Charter. 
UNSCOM's mandate 
UNSCOM was a unique agency whose mandate, auditing 
Iraq's complete and enduring disarmament of proscribed 
weapons and items, is unequalled in the history of 
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disarmament. Because UNSCOM was created as part of a 
cease-fire resolution, its mandate did not conform to the 
consensual principle that governed most previous UN 
interventions." UNSCOM was set up to audit Iraq's 
declarations about the proscribed NBC programmes, weapons 
and their disarmament. For this purpose, UNSCOM had been 
given rights and technologies that enabled the agency to 
critically assess Iraqi statements. Several of these information-
gathering capabilities were 'cutting edge' and more intrusive 
than the capabilities of other UN agencies at this point. 
Similarly, the amount of information that UNSCOM received 
from national governments, and its organisational capacity to 
assess and make use of this information, was unprecedented in 
the UN system. 53 UNSCOM's use of intelligence provided by 
friendly governments introduced a number of challenges in 
terms of analysis and handling. UNSCOM had to establish 
procedures for processing this intelligence in a secure and 
confidential manner in order to encourage intelligence 
agencies to provide further information:" 
When UNSCOM was established, three organizational 
features were designed to make the agency independent of 
external political influence and thus more able to effectively 
fulfil its mandate. First, UNSCOM was set up as an organ of 
the Security Council, which it was answerable to, whereas the 
UN Secretary General or the General Assembly exercised no 
direct influence. Second, the agency was not funded by the UN 
per se, but from contributions from individual countries and 
Iraqi funds in foreign banks that had been frozen after the 
Kuwait invasion. 55 When the oil-for-food resolution (Security 
Council Resolution 986) was accepted by Iraq in 1996, 
UNSCOM received some funds from Iraqi oil sales to cover 
;; Yale Oral History Project interview with EkeUs {3), p. 24. 
u Trevan (1999), pp. 213-14; Yale Oral History Project interview with 
Hannay,pp.lS-19. 
5~ Tim Trevan (1999), pp. 213-16; author's interview with EkCus (2003). 
55 Yale Oral Hiscory Project interview with EkeUs (3), p. 7. 
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their expenses:" These two factors, UNSCOM's financing and 
independence of the UN Secretary General and the General 
Assembly, were intended to insulate the agency and its 
reporting from political influences and controversies. Finally, 
the wide-ranging powers of the executive chairman gave 
UNSCOM considerable independence and freedom of action. 
These powers enabled the chairman to implement the full 
range of rights that had been negotiated between Iraq and the 
UN in 1991, and decide how to pursue UNSCOM's very 
general mandate in Iraq. 
UNSCOM - a unique organisation 
UNSCOM's headquarters was housed in the UN main 
building in New York. The bulk of the strategic operational 
planning, analysis and external relations took place in the UN 
headquarters. UNSCOM was divided into two major nnits. 
The 'operations unit' planned upcoming inspections, while the 
'information and assessment unit' dealt with information 
collection and analysis of data obtained from inspections or 
supporting governments." UNSCOM's inspections and 
monitoring were conducted from field offices in Iraq by 
resident staff and experts provided to UNSCOM by national 
governments. The fact that UNSCOM's staff did not consist 
of UN employees contributed to the development of a distinct 
UNSCOM 'team spirit'. Another important factor in creating 
an esprit de corps was the relative isolation from other UN 
staff, which was necessary, given the sensitive nature of 
UNSCOM's work in Iraq." 
UNSCOM's staff consisted of diplomats and experts 
equipped with specific skills or knowledge required for 
upcoming tasks in Iraq. In addition to the experts and 
diplomats, supporting staff in various roles was crucial for the 
% Krasno and Sutterlin (2003), p. 26. 
57 Yale Oral History Project interview \\'ith EkeUs {2), p. 13. 
'' Tim Trevan (1999), p. 217. 
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daily running of UNSCOM's activities in Iraq. For specific 
inspection n1issions, it was necessary to obtain expertise 
outside UNSCOM's core of inspectors to assist with forensic 
investigations. For example, construction engineers were 
recruited to help safely locate archives in buildings that had 
been destroyed by bombing in the Gulf War. Another example 
was the use of computer scientists for establishing whether 
substantial amounts of files had been deleted from computers 
prior to an UNSCOM inspection. 
Another unique feature of this disarmament regime was the 
auditing bodies' extensive rights of access when collecting 
information about Iraq's compliance with the disarmament 
requirements of Resolution 687. In negotiations between Iraq 
and the UN in 1991 after the passing of resolution 687, 
UNSCOM was given wide-ranging rights of access to collect 
information on the disarmament of Iraq's proscribed weapons 
and items as well as monitoring sites where proscribed 
capabilities could be re-established. Because UNSCOM's 
rights in pursuing their mandate were negotiated as part of a 
cease-fire agreement, these were far more intrusive and wide-
ranging than those in other inspection regimes. At that point, 
the future implications of UNSCOM's rights of access were 
probably not fully realized by all members of the Security 
Council." UNSCOM had wide-ranging rights of access in Iraq 
under the 'any-time, anywhere' principle, enabling UNSCOM 
to inspect sites in Iraq without giving prior notice of the 
inspection. It is now generally accepted that UNSCOM's 
extensive rights of access and cutting-edge technologies and 
tools enabled UNSCOM to achieve a level of insight 
unprecedented in the history of disarmament."' The degree to 
which UNSCOM would make use of the extensive rights of 
H This view has been expressed by a number of UNSCOM inspecrors. 
Author's interview with Smidovich (2004). 
•A) This view is also widely held among UNSCOM inspectors. For example: 
author's interviews with Smidovich (2004) and Igor A. ~1itrokhin (2004 a). 
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access depended on the agency's confidence in Iraqi 
cooperation and compliance with disarmament. In the 
following years, UNSCOM's executive chairman, Rolf Ekeus, 
used these negotiated rights to create an organizational 
capability to collect and analyse information of a scope that 
had not been foreseen in 1991.61 
The conflicts that emerged during the seven years 
UNSCOM was in Iraq, particularly in 1997-98, turned 
UNSCOM into a highly controversial UN agency. Because 
Iraq's declarations of the proscribed weapons, programmes 
and their disposition were incomplete (and in some cases 
sought to mislead the disarmament accounting), investigations 
of the omitted issues concerning Iraq's proscribed programmes 
and weapons led to several stand-offs between UNSCOM and 
Iraq. In 1997 and 1998, the agency started to investigate 
various activities seen as part of a systematic Iraqi effort to 
retain proscribed items and capabilities. This resulted in more 
conflicts between UNSCOM and Iraqi officials who accused 
UNSCOM of violating Iraq's national security interests. 
Allegations also emerged in the American media that 
UNSCOM's information gathering was 'tapped' by the CIA. 
The negative attention that resulted from these and other 
issues created controversies that became part of the wider 
debate over the sanctions on Iraq and the Iraqi NBC 
disarmament. 
The impact of Iraq's partial cooperation 
The disarmament regime was designed based on the 
assumption that the combination of economic incentives and 
the threat of military punishment would persuade Iraq to 
disarm of NBC weapons and capabilities, as well as cooperate 
with UNSCOM's disarmament accounting efforts. However, 
Iraq's failure to fully comply with Resolution 687's extensive 
"
1 Author's interview with Nikita Smidovich (2004 ); Yale Oral Historv 
Project interview with Hannay, p. 10. · 
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demands of disarmament and cooperation had crucial 
implications for UNSCOM and the disarmament regime's 
prospect for success. 
In 1991 UNSCOM's executive chairman Rolf Eb§us 
expected that the economic incentives would convince Saddam 
Hussein to comply with the disarmament requirements and 
cooperate with UNSCOM. Therefore, Ekeus set up UNSCOM 
as an organization capable of verifying Iraq's disarmament in 
technical terms, expecting that this could be achieved within 
12 months.';' Thus UNSCOM's initial design was based on the 
expectation that its main occupation would be to verify Iraqi 
disarmament and assist in the disarmament process. At this 
point, UNSCOM expected that its main tasks would be to 
verify Iraqi declarations, assist with Iraq's disarmament of 
CBW and proscribed ballistic missiles, and develop a 
• . 63 
momtonng system. 
Between 1991 and December 1998, UNSCOM audited 
Iraq's compliance with the political objective of 'complete' 
disarmament by accounting for the disposal of all of Iraq's 
proscribed weapons and items. The so-called 'material 
balance' approach was designed to enable UNSCOM to 
establish the net sum of Iraq's proscribed items and weapons 
and deduct the sum of proscribed objects whose destruction 
had been verified. UNSCOM depended on Iraqi cooperation 
to establish what proscribed weapons and capabilities existed 
in Iraq prior to the Gulf War and verify whether these had 
been destroyed. 
It became clear already in 1991 that Iraq's cooperation with 
UNSCOM was far from complete. Iraq did not provide 
complete and accurate declarations of its former weapons 
programmes, omitting significant information with the aim of 
retaining proscribed weapons and capabilities. After months 
f! Author's interview with EkCus (2003 ); Yale Oral History Project interview 
with Ekeus (3), pp. 1-2 . 
• ;
1 Author's interview with Buchanan (2004 ). 
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of hiding retained CBW, proscribed missiles and items, Iraq 
destroyed the majority of these objects unilaterally in the 
summer of 1991. This decision followed a number of rigorous 
inspections, and the ISG reported that this was triggered by an 
!AEA inspection led by David Kay where Iraqi concealment of 
proscribed items was documented by the inspectors." This 
secret retention, and the subsequent unilateral destruction, 
both violated Resolution 687's demands. 
Iraq's incomplete cooperation gave rise to a number oi 
unanswered questions about the proscribed CB\V and BM 
programmes. For example, for several years Iraq denied the 
offensive BW programme, its advanced achievements in (VX) 
nerve gas research and weaponization, and its efforts to 
indigenously manufacture ballistic missiles (Al-Husseiu). 
Therefore, UNSCOM was not able to map the totality of 
Iraq's proscribed capabilities or the exact number of all 
proscribed weapons and items Iraq had possessed. Iraq's 
denials and omissions made UNSCOM unable to set up a full 
and verified material balance of Iraq's proscribed weapons 
and their destruction. Iraq's incomplete cooperation made the 
prospect of fully achieving the disarmament objectives of 
Resolution 687 seem less than promising. 
When the full scope of Iraq's deception was revealed after 
the August 1995 defection of Hussein Kamel, the former 
director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation, 
UNSCOM was forced to undertake investigations and forensic 
work to audit Iraq's claims at a level that had not been 
originally intended." Iraq's incomplete cooperation had 
important implications for how UNSCOM assessed Iraq's 
declarations about proscribed weapons and programmes. 
Iraq's withholding of important information about the current 
status of proscribed weapons and programmes introduced 
64 Duelfer (2004b), Section 3: Iraq's Chemical \Xlarfare Program, p. 31. 
'' UNSCOM (1999). 
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uncertainties and unknowns into UNSCOM's disarmament 
accounung. 
Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM was considered an 
indicator of the level of Iraq's compliance with the 
disarmament objectives in Resolution 687. UNSCOM audited 
the declarations submitted by Iraq, and subsequently launched 
investigations that uncovered information about Iraq's 
proscribed weapons and programmes that had been omitted 
or misrepresented in these declarations. These discoveries 
enabled UNSCOM to verify the destruction of proscribed 
items and weapons, including those that Iraq had sought to 
retain in secret in 1991. UNSCOM's investigations pressured 
Iraq to disclose more information about the proscribed 
programmes, and led to the destruction of additional weapons 
and items. UNSCOM's verification of Iraqi destruction of 
proscribed weapons and items mainly took place during 
1991-93, but was followed by a second series of disarmament 
verification efforts after the Hussein Kamel defection in 
August 1995. 
Iraq's 'incremental approach' to disarmament and declaring 
information about their proscribed programmes suggested a 
pattern where some proscribed items or information were 
always withheld by Iraq. The unilateral destruction of 
proscribed weapons in 1991 raised the question whether Iraq 
had retained other proscribed weapons, items or missiles. For 
example, initially Iraq only declared around half of their CW 
and one third of their ballistic missiles to UNSCOM. This 
pattern was demonstrated over a number of years, which 
established an impression in several countries that Iraqi 
declarations concerning NBC disarmament were 'inherently' 
incomplete." 
Iraq's incomplete cooperation was evident in Iraq's 
declarations concerning disarmament or their former 
programmes. Iraqi declarations had clearly identifiable and 
''"Martin Woolacott (2004). 
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conspicuous omissions, in terms of the information on the 
proscribed programmes and the evidence Iraq offered to back 
these claims. Iraq's admission in the autumn of 1995 that it 
had been able to retain proscribed weapons and items for 
several months in 1991 proved Iraq's ability to hide such 
items despite the presence of inspectors.'" UNSCOM took the 
view that Iraq's unilateral disarmament in 1991 was in part 
an attempt to hide Iraq's achievement in their proscribed 
programmes, such that UNSCOM wonld not be able to 
identify and destroy all of Iraq's production and development 
capabilities." After realizing in 1995 the scope of Iraq's past 
efforts to withhold information and proscribed items and 
weapons, UNSCOM's accounting task turned into a complex 
and large-scale investigation into Iraq's proscribed 
programmes and weapons. It is still an open question to what 
extent Iraq's omissions and incomplete documentation in their 
declarations was a deliberate attempt to mislead UNSCOM 
and retain proscribed capabilities. 
UNSCOM's effort to account for the disposition and 
destruction of all of Iraq's proscribed weapons and items in 
the face of Iraq's incomplete cooperation gave rise to a 
number of unresolved disarmament issues. UNSCOM was 
unable to resolve these questions about Iraq's proscribed 
programmes, weapons and their disarmament for various 
reasons. These included cases where Iraq was unable or 
refused to offer evidence to back their statements, claims that 
were disproved by physical evidence, and instances where the 
available evidence could not fully confirm Iraq's declarations. 
In UNSCOM's material balance accounting, all these issues 
were categorised as 'unaccounted for' or 'unverified'. 
UNSCOM was not arguing that all these issues were results of 
Iraqi retention of proscribed weapons and items. However, it 
became an important question for the disarmament 
~' UNSCOM 1999, Annex D: Section on disarmament. 
"' Ibid. 
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accounting whether the unresolved issues were symptoms of a 
systematic Iraqi attempt- a so-called 'concealment 
mechanism'- to retain information, proscribed weapons and 
items. 
By the end of 1998, UNSCOM had accounted for the 
destruction of large amounts of proscribed weapons and 
facilities that had been identified as having been part of Iraq's 
CBW and proscribed BM programmes. However, because of 
Iraq's partial cooperation there remained significant 
nncertainties in the accounting for Iraq's disarmament. These 
concerned UNSCOM's understanding of Iraq's proscribed 
programmes and capabilities, and whether Iraq had destroyed 
all proscribed weapons and items. These unresolved issues 
made it impossible for UNSCOM to report that Iraq had been 
'completely' disarmed. Whether this uncertainty meant that 
Iraq still posed a threat to international security was a 
question for the Security Council to consider. 
Monitoring disarmament 
In addition to verifying the destruction of Iraq's proscribed 
weapons and programmes, UNSCOM was to oversee that 
T raq remained disarmed. For this purpose UNSCOM would 
set up a long-term monitoring system. It was assumed from 
the outset that there would be an element of overlap between 
the disarmament stage and the monitoring stage (e.g. in 
Security Council Resolution 715, 1991). The Ongoing 
Monitoring and Verification (OMV) system was intended to 
ascertain that Iraq's civilian undertakings were not diverted 
for proscribed activities. OMV enabled the disarmament 
regime to control the residual risk that the proscribed 
capabilities could be reconstituted and served as a confidence-
building measure. 
The OMV system was underpinned by the assumption that 
the incentive of lifting the sanctions and the risk of 
punishment if prohibited activities were discovered by OMV 
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would persuade Iraq to refrain from undertaking proscribed 
activities in monitored sites." However, Iraq's disarmament 
was never fully verified by UNSCOM. In spite of resolutions 
687 and 715 (1991), lraq resisted the setting up of such a 
monitoring system until November 1993. Iraq's lacking 
cooperation meant that OMV had to operate under different 
conditions than the Security Council had intended when the 
system was created as part of the disarmament regime in 
1991. 
From the outset, UNSCOM assumed that Iraq would 
disarm and provide a verifiable and complete declaration of its 
proscribed programmes. In order to be effective, the OMV 
system depended on Iraqi access and cooperation. When Iraq 
failed to fully cooperate with UNSCOM, this had important 
implications for OMV. An important question became, given 
that Iraq's disarmament was never fully verified by 
UNSCOM, what kind of conclusions could be drawn about 
Iraq's 'continued disarmament' based on the findings from the 
OMV system. 
OMV enabled UNSCOM to monitor whether specific sites 
were diverted for proscribed purposes. Even though this 
system was not considered able to discover all attempts to 
undertake proscribed activities in these sites, or attempts to do 
so in clandestine sites, it was likely that UNSCOM would 
discover systematic or large-scale attempts to divert dual-
capable items for proscribed purposes. 
Iraq's incomplete cooperation and attempts to undermine 
UNSCOM's efforts to account for and verify disarmament 
made OMV a very important tool in the effort to ensure that 
Iraq did not rebuild proscribed capabilities. OMV's primary 
role was to enable UNSCOM to detect anomalies at specific 
sites that could be investigated to establish whether proscribed 
activities had been taking place."' As doubt about Iraq's 
''~ UNSCOM (1999), Section on Ongoing Monitoring and Verification. 
~' 1 Author's interview wirh Smidovich (2003a). 
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commitment to disarmament increased, UNSCOM's main 
monitoring aims became to deny Iraq the possibility of 
diverting capabilities for proscribed purposes, and increase the 
risk of diverting proscribed or dual-capable items and 
activities to sites that were not part of the monitoring system." 
With regard to possible diversion of proscribed items or 
activities to clandestine sites, this would become vulnerable 
for detection and could allow UNSCOM to locate such 
clandestine sites. Concerning the possible diversion of dual-
capable items to sites that were not under monitoring, if this 
was discovered it would be more difficult for Iraqis to prove 
that this was not undertaken for legal purposes. This 
increased the risk Iraq faced if it were caught retaining 
declarable items and activities outside the OMV system." 
Trying to monitor all activities that could contribute to 
some aspect of the proscribed capabilities and programmes 
would be an unmanageable task. Therefore, UNSCOM 
focused on detecting diversions that could contribute to actual 
production of proscribed items, rather than trying to be able 
to identify all signs of any proscribed activities." UNSCOM 
checked Iraq's declarations of dual-capable sites against its 
own information gathering, which enabled the organization to 
discover attempts to rebuild proscribed capabilities or 
retention of items that ought to be declared for monitoring by 
the UN. 
OMV was an integrated system that focused individually on 
the biological, chemical and missile areas. It consisted of a 
complex of different surveillance and monitoring means, some 
of which focused on the use of particular equipment or site 
activities, while U2 photography and environmental sensors 
scanned for signs of proscribed activities outside the 
" Ibid. 
" Ibid. 
73 Author's interview with Smidovich (2003b). 
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monitored sites." Because the system was comprised of a 
number of different technologies and analytical tools, 
UNSCOM was confident that systematic attempts to re-
establish proscribed capabilities in order to produce 
proscribed weapons would be detected over time." Overall, it 
is not possible to single out one particular tool that was more 
important than all others. It was the combination of the 
complex of monitoring technologies, the legal setting, 
UNSCOM's rights and the implementation of the resources 
available to UNSCOM that developed OMV into a good 
oversight mechanism.'" 
The OMV system was implemented according to the risk 
that specific site features could be diverted for proscribed 
purposes, and was continuously updated to reflect changes in 
activities or features of the relevant sites. The intensity, 
frequency and style of monitoring was shaped according to 
the degree to which elements in each site could be used to 
create proscribed weapons." UNSCOM established oversight 
over dual-capable equipment that could be used for 
proscribed purposes, and focused its monitoring efforts on 
sites that posed the highest risk of converting rapidly to 
undertake proscribed activities. UNSCOM's knowledge about 
Iraq's proscribed capabilities was important for making OMV 
more effective. This information, and UNSCOM's assessment 
of the inherent capabilities of each monitored site, enabled 
UNSCOM to target OMV at 'bottlenecks' that had to be 
overcome to produce proscribed weapons rather than trying 
to monitor every type of site equally intensively." 
Iraq's incomplete cooperation had the result that in the 
early stages of the disarmament accounting, intelligence 
information submitted by national governments was 
"Miilfrid Bra ut (2003), pp.lS-19. 
'·' UNSCOM (1999}, Section on Ongoing Monitoring and Verification. 
'"'Author's interview with Mitrokhin (2004a). 
"lvLllfrid Bra ut (2003), p. 17. 
"UNSCOM (1999), Annex A: Missile Monitoring. 
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important for setting up UNSCOM's initial investigations and 
inspections. However, once UNSC:OM had established its 
own information gathering and analytical capabilities these 
became the agency's most important source of information." 
In OMV, the combination of cutting-edge technologies with 
access to all sites that UNSCOM considered it was necessary 
to monitor, resulted in an intrusive monitoring capability. 
Through this system, UNSCOM developed a degree of 
oversight that enabled it to identify anomalies in a wide range 
of facilities. UNSCOM considered that it had better access to 
information and also had better analytical capacities than 
national intelligence services. Eventually, this information 
gathering and analysis provided an unequalled oversight in the 
. d 80 tnon1tore areas. 
UNSCOM's role: adaptation and pressures 
UNSCOM's role was to report technical assessment of Iraq's 
disarmament to the Security Council. This 'technical 
objectivity' was important for the credibility of the 
disarmament regime. The attempt to insulate UNSCOM from 
political influences (from the Secretary General and the UN 
General Assembly) was intended to secure UNSCOM's 
technical role. Thomas Pickering, the United States permanent 
representative to the UN in 1991, has argued that the 
'depoliticisation' of UNSCOM embodied in Security Council 
Resolution 687 was intended to enable the agency to act 
independently and thus effectively." However, after 
UNSCOM inspectors arrived in Iraq, obstruction of a number 
of inspections and attempts to deny the agency access to 
information served to politicise UNSCOM's role. Chairman 
79 Tim Trevan (1999), p. 218, p. 220. This is also a widely held view among 
UNSCOM inspectors, e.g. author's interviews with Kdly (2003a) and EkCus 
(2003). 
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(2003); Kelly (2003 a). 
"
1 Krasno and Sutterlin (2003), p. 5. 
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Ekt~us took the view that Iraq's resistance made UNSCOM's 
task inherently political, and he sought to secure the agency's 
ability to account for Iraq's disarmament through negotiations 
with Iraqi leaders and Security Council members."' Because of 
Iraq's incomplete cooperation, UNSCOM's ability to audit 
Iraq's disarmament depended on diplomatic efforts to ensure 
that UNSCOM could make use of the rights of access it had 
obtained in 1991. 
As a result of Iraq's continuous resistance and the Security 
Council's weakening commitment to the objective of complete 
Iraqi NBC disarmament, UNSCOM's role in the disarmament 
regime increasingly came under pressure. By the end of 1998, 
UNSCOM's technical role had been politicised by Iraqi 
accusations, pressure from Security Council members and 
interventions by the UN Secretary General. Iraq challenged the 
scientific objectivity of some of UNSCOM's analyses, and 
accused UNSCOM inspectors of collecting other information 
concerning Iraq's national security. 83 Security Council 
members encouraged UNSCOM to go beyond their technical 
reporting and assess the potential threat represented by the 
possibility that Iraq retained CBW and proscribed missile 
capabilities. In 1998 the UN Secretary General travelled to 
Iraq to resolve a conflict over UNSCOM's access. 
Unfortunately, this undermined UNSCOM's position because 
the Secretary General treated Iraq and UNSCOM as equal 
parties in a dispute, rather than confirming UNSCOM's 
superior position as a subsidiary agency of the Security 
Council." These developments undermined the intended 
distinction between the political and technical levels in the 
disarmament regime. 
The disarmament regime's 'carrots and sticks' exercised a 
limited but substantial impact on Iraq's compliance with 
".!Author's interview with Ekeus (2003). 
!u Ibid.; author's interview with Kelly (2003 a); Krasno and Sutterlin (2003). 
H Krasno and Sutterlin (2003 ), pp. 123-31. 
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Resolution 687, as long as the Security Council appeared to 
be committed to enforce those disarmament objectives." If 
Iraq valued the NBC programmes as essential assets for the 
regime's survival it was unlikely that economic incentives 
would convince Iraq's leaders to abolish these weapons and 
capabilities. However, the ISG report argues that the Iraqi 
regime always struggled with striking a balance between 
cooperating with UN inspectors, so that sanctions would be 
lifted, and at the same time giving Iran the impression that 
NBC capabilities remained. This suggests that the Iraqi regime 
was unable to resolve the conflict between economic 
incentives and what it considered a security imperative- to 
deter Iran based on its NBC capabilities. The combination of 
incentives and deterrents appeared to be important factors 
influencing Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM."' 
As it turned out, the sanctions did not have the intended 
impact, i.e. full cooperation and compliance with Resolution 
687, on Iraqi decision-making. Ultimately, disagreements 
within the Security Council undermined the deterrent impact 
that the Security Council could have continued to exercise 
over Iraq through this disarmament regime. 
Diminishing prospects of success 
The prospect of lifting the economic sanctions appears to have 
been important in persuading Iraq to offer a basic level of 
cooperation with UNSCOM's efforts in disarmament 
verification and monitoring." However, the impact of these 
incentives was defined by the Security Council's commitment 
to achieve complete NBC disarmament and UNSCOM's 
investigatory skills demonstrating the extent of Iraq's 
H For more on the 'carrot-and-stick' approach, please see Tim Trevan 
(1999), pp. 212-13. 
F,-, For a view that sanctions were highly effective, please see Lopez and 
Cortwright (2004 ). 
"Lopez and Cortwright (2004), p. 91. 
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cooperation. The United States' ambivalence concerning 
whether they would agree to lift sanctions if the stated 
objectives of the disarmament regime were achieved (but with 
Saddam Hussein remaining in power) weakened the credibility 
of the disarmament regime. When Iraq took the view that the 
United States would not endorse lifting of sanctions before 
Saddam Hussein was removed from power this incentive was 
no longer effective. Thus, the positive impact that the prospect 
of lifting sanctions had on Iraqi cooperation with UNSCOM 
was undermined. Madeleine Albright's speech at Georgetown 
on 26 March 1997 made it clear that the United States would 
not lift sanctions until regime change had taken place in Iraq. 
This was followed by a clear reduction in Iraqi cooperation 
with UNSCOM in 1997-98, culminating in UNSCOM's 
eviction and final departure prior to Desert Fox. It is 
noteworthy that the ISG report underplays the impact of this 
turning point, and explains Saddam Hussein's decision to 
evict UNSCOM inspectors in terms of his personal anger after 
UNSCOM's discoveries in 1997-98, specifically of VX 
remnants in 1997 and a document the following year 
suggesting that Iraq's declarations of its CW holdings in 1991 
had been substantially inadequate.'" 
The threat of military enforcement under Chapter 7 of the 
UN Charter underpinned the disarmament regime's deterrent 
impact. However, the Security Council's threshold for 
resorting to military enforcement action was high. Therefore, 
the low probability of military strikes being initiated by the 
Security Council to punish Iraq limited the scope of this 
deterrent influence to the most serious violations of 
Resolution 687. Adding to this, the increasing difficulty for 
the US to gather support to mobilise military strikes against 
Iraq made the threat of force a 'diminishing asset'."" In 
Baghdad, the Security Council's failure to respond to Iraqi 
~G Duelfer (2004b), Section 3: Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program, p. 13. 
'"Cockburn and Cockburn (2002), p. 264. 
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non-cooperation with more than words was considered to 
reveal the Security Council's inability to do so. UN 
Resolutions (and numerous Security Council statements) 
condemning Iraqi non-cooperation became increasingly 
unimpressive to the Iraqi regime." 
The Security Council's dependence on consensus in order to 
effectively respond to Iraqi cooperation or lack thereof 
gradually undermined the impact of the 'carrot-and-stick' 
enforcement on Iraq. In the case of Iraq and UNSCOM, the 
Security Council had diverging views on what was necessary 
to result in lifting sanctions. At certain points the Council 
differed on whether 'complete' NBC disarmament of Iraq 
would be sufficient to remove the Iraqi threat to its 
neighbours. In 1997-98, it emerged that the United States was 
committed to a policy of regime change in Iraq as a condition 
for lifting sanctions, while other Security Council members 
(France, Russia and China) would be satisfied with successful 
NBC disarmament. Gradually, the Council's consensus eroded 
as a result of such differences. 
Erosion and failure 
The fragility of the Security Council consensus became evident 
prior to and after Operation Desert Fox in 1998. In 1997, 
Iraq expelled American UNSCOM inspectors arguing that 
they were 'spies', and only readmitted these inspectors after a 
military build-up by the United States and Britain." Iraq also 
refused UNSCOM access to Saddam Hussein's residential 
palaces. Iraq's repeated obstructions of UNSCOM's 
inspections, and warnings from the United States and Britain 
that military strikes would be initiated, led to UNSCOM's 
departure from Iraq in December 1998." Subsequently, the 
United States and Britain launched operation Desert Fox. The 
9
') Ibid.; author's correspondence with Buchanan (2004). 
;
1 Defenselink: Desert Fox. 
91 Author's correspondence with Ewen Buchanan. 
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US and the UK struck 97 facilities, most of which were related 
to Iraq's military capability and fewer than ten contributed to 
missile"related activities." Eleven facilities that the United 
States defence secretary William Cohen claimed contributed to 
CBW production were attacked, but not destroyed." 
While the consensus in the Security Council had previously 
been weakened by disagreement on what was required to lift 
sanctions on Iraq, Operation Desert Fox undermined the 
Council's consensus. In the aftermath, the Security Council 
failed to agree on the future of inspections in Iraq, specifically 
on the question whether the focus should be on a combination 
of monitoring and disarmament or a monitoring regime. 
While the United States and Britain argued that it was 
necessary to undertake both disarmament and monitoring, 
another group consisting of Russia, France and China argued 
in favour of lifting sanctions and reinstating a monitoring 
regime in Iraq.95 Their inability to agree led to the premature 
discontinuation of UNSCOM. 
91 Ibid. 
9~ Diamond (1998); Jim Garamone (undated); Cockburn and Cod(burn 
(2002), p. 284. 
"Diamond (1999a). 
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Chapter 4 
Resolution. 687: 'Mission 
Impossible'?,, 
In retrospect, the attempt to achieve complete NBC 
disarmament in Iraq through the UN-led disarmament regime 
might seem to have been a 'mission impossible' from the 
outset. The difficulties of defining and accounting for 
'complete' disarmament of CBW and proscribed BM were 
considerable. Iraq's limited cooperation and the eroding 
consensus in the Security Council reduced the probability that 
the disarmament regime would successfully achieve the 
objectives of Resolution 687. 
Several analysts have pointed to the wide-ranging 
disarmament objectives and the weakening of the Security 
Council's consensus as being the main reasons for 
UNSCOM's premature withdrawal from Iraq. Scott Ritter has 
argued that the disarmament regime's objective of 'complete' 
disarmament resulted in a 'deadlock' between Iraq and the 
Security Council that ultimately led to the discontinuation of 
UNSCOM's efforts in Iraq." Stephen Black drew a contrast 
between UNSCOM's substantial achievements and the 
Security Council's weakening commitment to achieve the 
%The use of this term in this context emerged in a discussion with Jeffrey 
Alien and others to whom I am grateful. 
"'Scott Ritter (2000). 
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objectives of Resolution 687, and argued that the latter was 
the reason why the agency did uot return to Iraq after 
Operation Desert Fox." Charles Duelfer pointed to inherent 
difficulties of achieving 'complete' NBC disarmament, and 
argued that a UN agency would not be able to enforce NBC 
disarmament on an unwilling sovereign country due to these 
actors' differing abilities to maintain cohesion and 
• 99 
commitment. 
These explanations contribute to understanding the 
difficulties of achieving the disarmament objectives of 
Resolution 687 and why UNSCOM's activities were 
discontinued after Operation Desert Fox. However, the 
disarmament regime's outcome cannot be fully explained in 
terms of difficulties in accounting for 'complete' disarmament 
or a 'structural' inability to preserve consensus in the Security 
Council. It cannot be argued that the disarmament objectives 
'predetermined' the regime's failure, because the decision 
whether Iraq had satisfied the terms of Resolution 687 would 
be political. In fact, the Security Council did not formally 
depend on UNSCOM's (or the IAEA's) technical assessments 
when making this decision."" The Security Council could 
pronounce that Iraq had completely disarmed when it was 
satisfied that the country no longer posed a threat to 
international security in terms of proscribed weapons and 
capabilities, regardless of any outstanding disarmament issues. 
The decision wonld draw on the Council members' overall 
perception of Iraq's intentions and commitment to comply 
with Resolution 687. The erosion of the Security Council's 
consensus was not due to an 'inherent' inability to preserve 
agreement, but was caused by the emergence of different 
perceptions as to whether the unresolved disarmament 
" Stephen Black ( 1999). 
"Charles Dueller (2002). 
]()'1 Author's interview with Buchanan (2004). 
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questions meant that Iraq still posed a threat to international 
security. 
Objectives 
One of the most important and distinctive features of the 
disarmament regime was the wide-ranging scope of its 
objectives. Resolution 687 treated nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons as equally threatening to international 
security, despite substantial technical and strategic differences 
between these types of weapons. Because Saddam Hussein had 
used CW against Iranian soldiers and Iraqi civilians, the three 
weapon categories were all considered to be potential threats 
to international security if they were in Saddam Hussein's 
hands. 101 
Resolution 687's objective of complete NBC disarmament, 
and its demand of full Iraqi cooperation with the disarmament 
accounting, encompassed more than any previous 
disarmament efforts. 102 The resolution required that Iraq 
destroy all CBW and limited the permitted range of BM to 
below 150 km. This would enable Iraq to defend itself against 
attack (which was considered necessary to preserve regional 
stability), although Iraq would not be able to launch missiles 
against the capitals of Iran or Israel. The resolution demanded 
that 'all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and 
components and all research, development, support and 
manufacturing facilities' be destroyed.w; Iraq's capability to 
make proscribed weapons would be eliminated by destroying 
the physical equipment and resources used (or acquired) to 
make CBW and proscribed BM, while monitoring would 
ascertain that the destroyed capabilities were not 
reconstituted. 
101 Author's interview with EkCus (2003). 
wl Yale Oral History project interview with Sergey Lavrov, pp. 26-27. 
1
'jj Security Council Resolurion 687 (1991). 
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UNSCOM's mandate, verifying Iraq's complete 
disarmament of CBW and proscribed BM and monitoring that 
these capabilities were not rebuilt, was an unprecedented 
task. 104 With regard to Iraq, fully describing and documenting 
all proscribed programmes, weapons and capabilities was a 
difficult undertaking. Iraqi authorities had to provide 
complete declarations of highly secretive and 
compartmentalized CBW and BM programmes, backed by 
adequate documentation, to enable UNSCOM to verify Iraq's 
statements. It was not unlikely that Iraq would not be able to 
provide sufficient and adequate documentation for all of these 
aspects. Therefore, the Security Council's overall confidence in 
Iraq's compliance with Resolution 687 would be crucial for 
whether gaps in the declarations or the supporting evidence 
would be perceived as indications of non-compliance. 
Determining disarmament? 
In 1995, Hussein Kamel's defection exposed Iraq's incomplete 
cooperation and subversive efforts on the disarmament 
regime. While this disarmament regime can be accused oi 
being created as an attempt to apply a 'technical fix' to an 
essentially political problem, Iraq's incomplete cooperation 
substantially politicised the disarmament accounting, with the 
result that accounting uncertainties became associated with 
the potential threat Iraq could pose to international security if 
it sought to retain or later rebuild proscribed weapons and 
capabilities. The politics in Iraq and in the Security Council 
influenced the disarmament accounting and determined 
whether sanctions would be lifted as a result of the Council 
members agreeing that Iraq had complied with Resolution 
687. 
In order to decide that Iraq had complied with Resolution 
687, the Security Council would have to become convinced 
w~ Verify: confirm a claim afrer assessing it according eo relevant evidence. 
For a good discussion) see Canada (1986). 
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that Iraq had decided to abolish the proscribed weapons and 
capabilities. However, Iraq's limited cooperation with 
UNSCOM reduced the probability that the Council would be 
convinced that Iraq was not attempting to retain proscribed 
capabilities. Some Security Council members' decreasing 
confidence in Iraq's intentions meant that unresolved 
disarmament issues were interpreted as a potential threat to 
international security. 
The process of determining whether Iraq was 'completely 
disarmed' would not, and could not, be decided by 
disarmament accounting alone. However, UNSCOM had to 
assess whether Iraq was disarming in compliance with 
Resolution 687 in technical terms to enable the Security 
Council to make informed decisions about Iraq. UNSCOM 
faced a number of challenges in how to define and assess 
whether Iraq was disarming according to the objectives of 
Resolution 687, for example defining the scope of 'complete' 
disarmament and drawing boundaries between permitted and 
proscribed items and capabilities. 
There is no technical definition of 'complete' NBC 
disarmament, no 'end point' that can identify when such a 
stage has been achieved, or any 'recipes' describing how to 
achieve this objective. UNSCOM's disarmament accounting 
focused on 'hardware': proscribed weapons and items used (or 
acquired for) the prohibited capabilities. UNSCOM sought to 
quantitatively account for all of Iraq's proscribed weapons 
and items, based on a comprehensive understanding oi Iraq's 
proscribed programmes and capabilities. The destruction of all 
proscribed weapons and their development and production 
infrastructures had an identifiable end-point, and conld be 
measured quantitatively. However, less tangible aspects of 
Iraq's capabilities, such as 'know-how' that had been 
established after decades of research, challenged the effort to 
achieve 'complete' disarmament."" While the accounting 
ws Author's interview with Ekeus (20()3), 
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approach was designed to be quantitatively 'measurable', any 
effort to account for all such weapons and items in a country 
would face significant challenges in terms of uncertainties that 
could emerge during the accounting. 10" 
In the area of ballistic missiles, UNSCOM faced a number 
of technical challenges in defining and distinguishing 
proscribed from permitted BM features. For example, 
different variables had an impact on the range of ballistic 
missiles (e.g. the weight of the warhead, which would differ 
according to whether it was filled with CBW agents or 
explosives). The difficulties of translating the objective of 
'complete' disarn1mnent into tneasurable categories and 
benchmarks meant that it would be difficult to devise a 
technical declaration stating that complete NBC disarmament 
had been achieved. An attempt to do so would encounter 
several difficulties in defining and proving the 'completeness' 
of the disarmament result. 
UNSCOM's disarmament accounting looked increasingly 
like a 'mission impossible' once it became clear after August 
1995 that Iraq's cooperation was limited, and that the agency 
had been substantially misled by Iraq's subversive efforts. The 
inherent difficulties of verifying complete disarmament of 
proscribed weapons and capabilities, in numerical and 
qualitative terms, were aggravated by Iraq's incomplete 
cooperation. This also reduced UNSCOM's confidence in the 
comprehensiveness of its accounting and auditing, which was 
based on Iraq's declarations, which in turn led to increased 
concerns from individual countries about Iraq's intentions in 
relation to disarming itself of CBW and proscribed BM. 
Iraq's limited cooperation gave rise to doubts whether 
UNSCOM was actually accounting for all proscribed 
weapons, items and capabilities, or whether Iraq retained 
aspects of their former programmes, weapons, and 
capabilities. The outstanding issues from UNSCOM's 
10
' Arnorim pand (1999). 
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accounting of Iraqi disarmament were increasingly interpreted 
as indicators of Iraq's intentions, particularly once UNSCOM 
realized how much it had been misled by Iraq between 1991 
and 1995. Subsequently, Iraq's limited cooperation 
continuously raised the threshold for the Security Council's 
decision that Iraq had fully complied with Resolution 687. 
Security Council: eroding consensus 
There were concerns within the Security Council that Saddam 
Hussein continued to retain elements of NBC programmes 
with the aim of re-establishing the proscribed ea pabilities at a 
future point. Iraq claimed that these activities ceased after 
Hussein Kamel's defection, but offered no evidence of such a 
decision. Although doubts emerged in the Security Council 
about whether Iraq would comply with Resolution 687, the 
disarmament regime was nonetheless considered as a tool that 
could limit the Iraqi threat to international security. As it 
became clear that Saddam Hussein remained in power and 
that Iraq's cooperation in the disarmament accounting process 
was limited, Security Council members reassessed the 
disarmament regime's role and prospect of success. 
The 'utility' of the UN disarmament regime in Iraq was not 
confined to the outcome of complete NBC disarmament in 
Iraq. Countries that were concerned about Iraq's intentions 
regarding the proscribed capabilities valued other gains from 
tl1e disarmament accounting and OMV. Even if the regime 
could not achieve complete disarmament in Iraq, as demanded 
in Resolution 687, it had achieved the destruction of 
substantial amounts of proscribed weapons and 
infrastructures. Moreover, the regime enabled the 
international community to deter Iraq's leaders from 
rebuilding the proscribed capabilities. The disarmament 
regime enabled the Security Council to contain Iraq in a 
legitimate and low-cost manner. If the threat of Iraqi NBC 
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capabilities could not be completely removed, it could be 
managed through the disarmament regime. 
The decision-making process in the Security Council 
ensured that a consensus was required to determine that Iraq 
had been irreversibly disarmed. Therefore, no country would 
be forced into 'acquitting' Iraq, while it would not be possible 
to lift sanctions if the US and Britain were not satisfied that 
the threat from Iraq had been eliminated. The widely 
encompassing scope of the disarmament objectives ensured 
that the technical process could be continued until the entire 
Security Council was satisfied that Iraq was completely 
disarmed. However, differences of opinion weakened the 
Security Council's ability to enforce disarmament on Iraq, 
which in turn decreased the deterrent impact of the threat of 
military punitive strikes. 
The difficulties in defining, assessing and achieving 
'complete' NBC disarmament turned out to be instrumental 
for those in the Security Council who wanted to continue the 
disarmament regime and sanctions until there had been regime 
change in Iraq. However, in the long term, the strategy of 
containing Iraq through the restraints posed by sanctions and 
UN inspections (the so-called 'containment strategy) was 
irreconcilable with the stated objective of the disarmament 
regime: to ascertain that all of Iraq's proscribed weapons and 
items had been destroyed and then lift the sanctions. 
The Security Council's consensus eroded due to differing 
opinions concerning the importance of fully achieving 
complete disarmament in Iraq. Moreover, the political nature 
of the disarmament objective made this regime inherently 
vulnerable to contending interpretations of this objective and 
the risk posed by any residual Iraqi NBC capabilities. The 
American and British ambiguity on whether they wonld be 
satisfied with Iraqi NBC disarmament while Saddam Hnssein 
ruled Iraq caused frustration among other Security Council 
members. Russia, China and F ranee did not want to endorse a 
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policy of regime change or perpetuate the UN disarmament 
regime indefinitely. These policy positions were irreconcilable 
in the longer run, and undermined the credibility of the 
disarmament process because it became unclear whether 
sanctions would be lifted if Iraq did in fact disarm. The 
consensus that underpinned the Security Council's ability to 
enforce disarmament in Iraq became increasingly fragile, while 
Iraq appeared determined to retain as much of their 
proscribed capabilities as possible. 107 
As argued in the previous chapter, from the outset in 1991 
the Security Council attempted to de-politicise the 
disarmament accounting process and agencies. The essentially 
political nature of the disarmament regime's objectives, 
introduced significant challenges to the attempt to de-politicise 
UNSCOM's role and mandate faced with Iraqi resistance. 
Because UNSCOM's mandate was defined in Resolution 687, 
its efforts in Iraq were defined and shaped by political 
influences. However, Iraq's non-cooperation made it 
impossible to maintain the attempt to insulate UNSCOM and 
its task from political influences and controversies. While this 
had been clear to UNSCOM's executive level for a while, 
when the impact of Iraq's non-cooperation and subversive 
efforts on the disarmament accounting effort became known 
after the Hussein Kamel defection it was increasingly realized 
that the attempt to depoliticise the disarmament accounting 
was failing. 
w
7 For more on this aspect, see Duelfer (2002). 
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Chapter 5 
UNSCOM's achievements in 
accounting for Iraq_' s 
disarmament 
In this chapter, UNSCOM's achievements in accounting for 
Iraq's disarmament will be assessed. Individual sections will 
first examine UNSCOM's achievements in accounting for the 
disarmament of Iraq's CW, BW and proscribed BM 
respectively. Then, this will be followed by an overview over 
UNSCOM's approach to accounting for Iraq's disarmament, 
its achievements in doing so, and the impact of Iraq's limited 
cooperation on the disarmament process. 
By December 1998, UNSCOM considered Iraq's 
disarmament as substantial, but not complete. Between 1991 
and 1994 UNSCOM verified the destruction of Iraq's known 
proscribed weapons and facilities dedicated to making or 
developing CW and BM of proscribed ranges. After the 
Hussein Kamel defection in August 1995 another round of 
disarmament verification was initiated that lasted until1997. 
This consisted of verifying the destruction of Iraq's known 
BW facilities and equipment, CW production equipment and 
precursor chemicals, and six units of proscribed BM 
d , . IO!J pro uctton eqmpment. 
""UNMOVIC report 12004) Appendix Ill. A. 
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Despite d1ese substantial disarmament achievements, the 
disarmament regime faced a number of unresolved questions 
about Iraq's proscribed weapons, capabilities and 
programmes. UNSCOM's final report in 1999 argued that 
'UNSCOM has achieved considerable progress in establishing 
material balances of Iraq's proscribed weapons. Although 
important elements still have to be resolved, the bulk of Iraq's 
proscribed weapons programmes has been eliminated'."" 
In the following, UNSCOM's achievements in accounting 
for the chemical, biological, and proscribed BM areas (and the 
risk that the capabilities could be subsequently re-established) 
will be examined. 
Chemical weapons 
Prior to the Gulf War, it was well known to the outside world 
that Iraq possessed a considerable chemical warfare capability. 
However, Iraq's most recent and advanced achievements in 
the CW area, and the details of its CW capabilities, remained 
unknown. Existing intelligence enabled the coalition to direct 
bomb attacks against Iraq's chemical warfare capability. 
Precision-bombing raids substantially damaged several of 
Iraq's CW production facilities. However, UNSCOM later 
discovered that the bombing attacks had not had as damaging 
an impact as the coalition had believed at the time. 110 
Perhaps because Iraq's chemical warfare capability was 
known to the outside world, Iraq provided some information 
about the CW weapons and programme to UNSCOM. 
However, Iraq did not provide complete declarations about its 
CW, me CW programme or capabilities. Iraq did not disclose 
the military concepts for the use of CW or information about 
the most recent and advanced achievements of the CW 
programmes. Iraq's partial declarations and UNSCOM's own 
investigations enabled UNSCOM to gradually map the general 
'" Amorim panel (1999). 
110 Krasno and Sutterlin (2003), p. 166. 
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aspects of Iraq's CW programme, its evolution and scope. For 
example, initially Iraq did not admit to their development of 
VX, the most poisonous and persistent nerve agent in Iraq's 
CW arsenal. However, UNSCOM managed to uncover Iraq's 
effort to make this nerve agent (and obtained indications that 
VX had been loaded into BM warheads) after investigating 
this issue between 1995 and 1998. 111 
UNSCOM managed to uncover aspects of Iraq's CW 
research and development, as well as information about Iraq's 
procurement for this programme, that Iraq had sought to 
hide .112 These discoveries were important for identifying the 
direction that Iraq's CW programme was heading in, 
understanding Iraq's capabilities and the level of 'self-
sufficiency' in the area of CW. For example, UNSCOM's 
understanding of Iraq's CW research, development and 
procurement networks was important for understanding the 
direction that Iraq's CW programme was heading towards at 
the time of the Kuwait invasion. 
Between 1991 and 1998 UNSCOM verified the destruction 
of large quantities of CW and items that had been part of the 
infrastructure developing and producing these weapons. 
UNSCOM reported Iraq's destruction of over 88000 filled 
and unfilled chemical munitions (aerial bombs, rockets, 
artillery shells and missile warheads), over 600 tonnes of CW 
agents, some 4000 tonnes of chemicals for CW agent 
production ('precursor chemicals'), over 980 pieces of key 
production equipment, and more than 300 pieces of analytical 
instruments. 113 UNSCOM also verified the dismantling of 
Iraq's main CW development and production complex. 114 
However, Iraq's incomplete cooperation with UNSCOM's 
accounting efforts left significant questions unanswered. 
'" Krasno and Sutterlin (2003), pp. 167-69. 
m Amorim panel (1999). 
m Ibid. 
IH Ibid. 
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Initially, Iraq declared approximately half of the chemical 
agents and weapons that UNSCOM eventually verified as 
destroyed. Iraq's unilateral destruction of CW in the summer 
of 1991 could only be partially verified based on the amount 
of evidence Iraq provided to UNSCOM.''' Moreover, 
UNSCOM's detection of traces of VX on BM warheads 
contradicted Iraq's claim that VX was not weaponized."' In 
October 1997 UNSCOM reported to the Security Council that 
Iraq's declarations on CW agents could not be verified 
because the evidence provided was insufficient to fullv confirm 
Iraq's claims. 117 
In the process of verifying Iraq's CW programmes and 
capabilities, UNSCOM obtained insights that were 
subsequently useful for assessing the risk of the remaining 
disarmament issues. For example, UNSCOM discovered that 
Iraq's CW agents did not have a long 'shelf-life'."" Since the 
final stages of the Iran-Iraq war Iraq had focused on the 
capability to rapidly produce large amounts of agents that 
could be loaded into delivery vehicles immediately prior to 
actual deployment, rather than producing caches of CW for 
storage. 119 Therefore, most Iraqi CW from prior to 1991 
would not be effective weapons for very long. 
During UNSCOM's accounting for Iraq's CW 
disarmament, concerns arose whether Iraq's declared sum 
total of CW, associated resources and equipment was 
accurate. An important event in this respect was UNSCOM's 
discovery of the so-called 'Air Force document' in July 1998. 
The content of this document suggested that Iraq had 
provided false declarations to UNSCOM, overstating the 
number of CW used in the Iran-Iraq war by some 6000-6500 
"'UNSCOM (1999), Section on Disarmament: Annex B (Table 1 ). 
116 UNSCOM (1999), Section on Disarmament: Annex B. 
"'Citing UNSCOM report (1997) S/1997/774 in UNSCOM (1999), Section 
on Disarmament: Annex B. 
'" Ekeus (2003). 
""Ibid.; Ritter (2000). 
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munitions. This document was seized from the UNSCOM 
chief inspector, which left an open question mark as to 
whether Iraq's declaration of CW existing in Iraq by 1991 
could be trusted. At the time, this suggested that a number of 
proscribed munitions could have been left out of UNSCOM's 
accounting 'baseline', and thus that this could have been an 
Iraqi attempt to avoid accounting for (and possibly also 
avoiding the destruction of) thousands of CW munitions. 
Years later, Iraq provided this document to UNMOVIC. 
A number of issues concerning the disposition of all of 
Iraq's CW activities and related infrastructure remained 
unresolved when UNSCOM departed from Iraq in December 
1998. Several of these issues had significant implications for 
UNSCOM's confidence in the Iraqi declaration of the sum 
total of CW and production equipment existing in Iraq in 
1991, which constituted the baseline against which the 
disarmament was measured. The degree to which UNSCOM 
had been able to verify Iraq's declarations was an important 
issue in UNSCOM's final assessment that was circulated in the 
Security Council in January 1999. UNSCOM established the 
final accounting for Iraq's CW programme based on Iraqi 
declarations that were not fully verified by UNSCOM."0 
The uncertainties in UNSCOM's disarmament accounting 
made it difficult for the Security Council to assess the exact 
impact of the disarmament regime on Iraq's CW capabilities. 
These difficulties concerned Iraq's declarations of their CW 
and programmes, and the question of whether Iraq had ceased 
to conceal CW and CW production equipment. Iraq had 
proved able to retain such equipment for several years. For 
example, Iraq had retained chemical agent production 
equipment from its main production facility prior to 
UNSCOM's arrival in 1991, and had moved this equipment 
around until it was finally handed over to the agency in 1996. 
However, Iraq did not explain how it had managed to hide 
!l(\ UNSCOM (1999), Section on Disarmament. 
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these items until July 1998. 121 This raised concerns whether 
other CW production equipment could have been removed 
and remain hidden. 
The risk that Iraq could re-establish CW development and 
production was not eliminated by the disarmament regime. 
Notwithstanding the destruction of Iraqi CW facilities and 
equipment, some of the equipment and resources used in 
civilian undertakings could be reconfigured in order to make 
CW agents. In an internal UNSCOM working paper, cited in 
an article by former UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter, it was 
pointed out that all production equipment used to make 
chemical agents have legitimate roles in industry. 122 As Rolf 
Ekeus argued in an interview in 1997, these items did not 
essentially constitute a threat as long as UNSCOM could 
certify that they had not been reconfigured from their 
legitimate purposes to chemical agent production. m Iflraq 
was committed to reacquiring an indigenous CW capability, 
this could be achieved by using 'dual-capable' equipment. 
Without the OMV system in Iraq there was a considerable 
risk that Iraq could start to rebuild CW capabilities with a 
low risk of detection. In the case of some CW agents, re-
establishing a production line could be achieved within 
months. 
Biological weapons 
Prior to the Gulf War, very little about Iraq's efforts in the 
BW area was known to the outside world. Therefore, in the 
BW area only one facility (Sa/man Pak, near Baghdad) was 
targeted by the coalition's precision bombing.'" In 1991, 
Iraq's leadership decided to conceal their BW programme 
from UNSCOM in order to retain this capability. Initially, 
121 UNSCOM (1999), Section on Disarmament; Annex B. 
"'Ritter (2000). 
wArms Control Today (1997). 
'" Barton (1998). 
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Iraq denied the existence of an (offensive) BW programme, 
and only admitted to have undertaken research on defence 
against BW attacks. Despite some suspicions among 
UNSCOM inspectors in 1991 that there might in fact have 
been a BW programme in Iraq, UNSCOM focused on 
verifying the content of Iraq's declarations in the CW and BM 
areas before the focus shifted to Iraq's omissions. 125 Another 
reason was that UNSCOM's executive level did not consider it 
was likely that there had been a large BW programme in Iraq, 
because this did not seem to make 'military sense' at that 
• 116 
t1n1e. 
However, in 1994 extensive investigations were set up that 
uncovered a number of indications of a BW programme. 
UNSCOM's mapping of Iraqi sites with technologies and 
materials that could be used for BW purposes, and tip-offs 
from Israeli intelligence, eventually brought about Iraq's 
admittance on 1 July 1995 that a BW programme existed. 127 
However, despite having admitted to the existence of a 
biological warfare programme, Iraqi leaders denied that the 
biological agents had been weaponized.m Iraq later admitted 
to having weaponized BW in R-400 aerial bombs, as well as 
having researched various methods of delivery (e.g. attempts 
to spread BW agents from spray tanks on airplanes). 
UNSCOM obtained detailed information about certain 
aspects of Iraq's BW programme, but was unable to develop 
an overview of its scope or general content. 129 Investigations 
uncovered information about the early stages of the BW 
programme, and the developments and achievements that 
shaped Iraq's biological warfare capabilities by 1991. 
UNSCOM was also able to retrieve some information about 
'~-'Author's interview with Kclly (2003a); author's interview with EkCus 
(2003). 
116 Author's interview with Ekeus (2003). 
"'Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg (1999), p. 307. 
us Author's interview with Kelly (2003b). 
"" Amorim panel (1999). 
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Iraq's procurement activities for its BW programme. 130 
UNSCOM acquired a detailed understanding of Iraq's delivery 
systems for BW.u 1 However, because of Iraq's incomplete 
declarations the agency was not able to determine the overall 
scope of Iraq's BW programme. Between 1991 and 1998, Iraq 
consistently provided less information about the BW 
programme than about the other proscribed programmes. 
Between 1991 and July 1995, Iraq's main BW facility (AI 
Hakam) was maintained and developed under a civilian cover. 
After Iraq's admission of having a BW programme, this 
facility was destroyed in 1996. UNSCOM also confirmed the 
destruction of some 60 pieces of equipment collected from 
three other sites involved in BW -activities. 22 tonnes of 
growth media collected from four sites, were destroyed under 
UNSCOM supervision. 132 However, several questions about 
Iraq's BW and the BW programme remain unsolved. For 
example, there were many unresolved issues concerning Iraq's 
achievements in research and development, its procurement 
efforts and the intended purpose of various biological agents 
Iraq had acquired for the BW programme. 133 
Despite the inherent limitations of what UNSCOM could 
discover about the BW programme, given Iraq's poor level of 
cooperation, the uncovering of this programme is widely 
considered as being UNSCOM's most important success. 134 As 
Christian Seelos has pointed out, UNSCOM is the first 
organization to have uncovered an existing, hidden BW 
programme .135 
Iraq's limited cooperation prevented UNSCOM from even 
attempting to construct a material balance in the BW area in 





u_; Krasno and Sutterlin (2003), p. 170. 
lH Author's interview with Ekeus (2003). 
"'Christian Seelos (1999). 
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January 1999. Frequent changes and omissions in Iraqi 
declarations and lacking evidence to support these claims 
weakened the credibility of Iraq's claims in the BW area. In 
January 1999, UNSCOM assessed that it had 'no confidence' 
that all BW agents had in fact been destroyed, that no BW 
remained in Iraq, or that a BW capability did not remain in 
I 136 raq. 
Although UNSCOM could not construct a material balance 
of Iraq's BW, in the report circulated in the Security Council 
in 1999 it assessed the credibility of Iraq's declarations about 
the BW programme. UNSCOM claimed it had a 'degree of 
confidence' in the accounting for some items that Iraq 
presented to the agency for verification, destruction or 
monitoring. This included the destruction of the main 
biological weapons production site (AI Hakam) and the 
equipment and resources inside, that facility which Iraq 
destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in 1996.m 
UNSCOM had 'less confidence' in Iraq's declaration that it 
had unilaterally destroyed a number of BW and BW agents 
(e.g. Iraq's claim about the quantity of unused aerial bombs 
and biological warfare agent)."" Finally, UNSCOM had 'little 
or no confidence' in declarations where no (or inadequate) 
physical or other forms of evidence were presented to back 
Iraq's claims. This concerned types of munitions that were 
filled with biological weapons agent, how much (and what 
kind of) biological agents were produced and destroyed, and 
the disposition of growth media used to produce the 
biological agents.'" In 1998, a meeting of technical experts 
from outside UNSCOM was set up to assess the agency's 
findings endorsed its assessments, and pointed to other issues 
where Iraq's declarations appeared to be conspicuous (e.g. the 
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lacking credibility of Iraq's stated BW production capacity 
and output in the area of BW). Ho 
The unsolved issues from the verification of Iraq's 
disarmament resulted in a considerable risk that BW and BW-
related items had been retained by Iraq. It was equally (if not 
more) disconcerting that dual-capable elements embedded in 
Iraqi civilian capabilities represented a considerable risk that 
Iraq's BW capabilities could be reestablished. Iraq's civilian 
industry contained dual-capable instruments, which meant 
that Iraq possessed 'hardware' and 'software' (knowledge 
from previous research in their biological weapons 
programme) that enabled rapid restitution of production of 
biological warfare agents. 141 The risk that Iraq's BW 
programme could be re-established was perceived as more 
serious after UNSCOM inspectors had left Iraq in December 
1998. Restarting elements of Iraq's BW programme or BW 
production would not take long, and would be difficult to 
detect without UN inspectors present in the country. 
Proscribed ballistic missiles 
The international community was aware of the existence of 
Iraq's BM capability before the Gulf War. In the course of the 
Gulf War some ofiraq's main missile engineering sites were 
destroyed by precision bombing, while other ballistic missile 
facilities were left unharmed. 1" However, in the area of BM 
Iraq's obligations and UNSCOM's task differed from the 
CBW disarmament. Iraq would still be allowed to have BM 
and BM capabilities, but only within the permitted range. 
UNSCOM sought to verify that Iraq did not retain missiles 
exceeding the permitted range, that Iraq did not modify 
permitted missiles so these could reach 150 km or above after 
J.l[i. Krasno and Sutterlin (2003), p. 169. 
'" Barron (1998); UNSCOM (1999); Amorim panel (1999). 
'" UNMOVIC (2003). 
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production, or try to retain capabilities specifically designed to 
create such missiles. 
Initially, Iraq appeared to be quite cooperative with 
UNSCOM. However, it turned out that Iraq had sought to 
conceal the nature and achievements of its BM programme.143 
Iraq failed to disclose a number of other aspects of its BM 
programme and capabilities to UNSCOM. Initially, Iraq only 
declared 113 of the BM it possessed at the end of the Gulf 
War. Iraq failed to declare its indigenous capability to 
produce BM of proscribed ranges, information that was not 
fully admitted until after Hussein Kamel's defection in 1995. 
Iraq sought to retain items for indigenous proscribed missiles 
production, and unilaterally destroyed BM in the summer of 
1991."~ By December 1998, UNSCOM had established a 
broad understanding of Iraq's BM programme. However, 
there were several missing pieces in this puzzle, for example 
which CBW agents the proscribed BM warheads had been 
filled with. Another unresolved issue was the nature and 
whereabouts of seven indigenously produced missiles. 145 
Despite Iraq's incomplete cooperation UNSCOM was able 
to verify the destruction of almost all ( 817 out of 819) 
imported operational missiles of proscribed ranges, 56 fixed 
launch sites and all declared mobile launchers for proscribed 
missiles.'" Further, UNSCOM verified the destruction of 
almost all (73 to 75) chemical and biological BM warheads; 
and the majority of conventional BM warheads declared by 
Iraq (83 of the 107 imported and some 80 of the 103 
indigenously produced). 147 
In this area, like in the CBW areas, a number of outstanding 
disarmament questions emerged as a result of Iraq's unilateral 
destruction and incomplete declarations. When it emerged 
141 UNSCOM (1999), Section on Disarmament: Annex A. 
IH Ibid. 
IH Ibid. 
''" Amorim (1999). 
HT Ibid. 
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that Iraq had indigenously produced BM of proscribed ranges 
this complicated UNSCOM's accounting process, because 
without adequate Iraqi documentation it was even more 
difficult to track indigenously acquired materials than 
imported ones. The omissions in Iraq's declarations had 
implications for UNSCOM's understanding of the country's 
BM capabilities and degree of 'self-sufficiency'. For example, 
Iraq did not assist with the accounting for proscribed BM 
engine parts that UNSCOM suspected might have been 
retained. These particular items would have been crucial for 
developing new proscribed missiles, or could indicate that 
some of Iraq's older BM had been retained. UNSCOM's 
inability to verify the destruction of a number of these and 
similar issues (such as Iraq's amount of proscribed BM 
propellants and warheads) therefore appeared conspicuous. In 
1996 UNSCOM assessed that if Iraq had actually retained the 
items that had not been accounted for, Iraq would have been 
able to make two ballistic missiles. 
After Hussein Kamel's defection, UNSCOM became aware 
of Iraq's attempts to substantially undermine its efforts to 
account for the proscribed BM programme, capabilities and 
the disposition of proscribed BM. At this point, UNSCOM 
also learned that after 1991 Iraq had secretly undertaken 
activities for development of the proscribed BM capabilities in 
parallel with its permitted BM activities. Iraq had continued to 
work on proscribed projects, including indigenous production 
of missile guidance and control systems."'Finally, after the 
Kamel defection, UNSCOM learned that Iraq had retained 
equipment for production of BM of proscribed ranges.'" 
UNSCOM discovered that several attempts had been made to 
import items clandestinely."' While Iraq stated that these 
projects and procurement activities had been terminated 
"' UNSCOM (1999). 
14 ~ Ibid. 
1511 Ibid. 
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quickly after they started, it did not offer UNSCOM evidence 
proving that this was the case."' 
Iraq's non-cooperation and subversive efforts made it 
impossible for UNSCOM to present a fully verified material 
balance of Iraq's proscribed BM. There were a number of 
unresolved disarmament issues and inadequate supporting 
evidence for some of Iraq's claims. In some cases, Iraq's 
methods of unilateral destruction (such as melting) made it 
impossible for UNSCOM to numerically account for specific 
items. As a result, Iraqi declarations were used as the basis of 
UNSCOM's accounting- with the uncertainties this entailed. 
Under Resolution 687, Iraq was allowed to make BM with 
ranges not exceeding 150 km. Therefore, Iraq's BM 
programme and capabilities were maintained and improved 
between 1991-1998. There was a latent possibility that Iraq 
could divert its BM activities to improve its BM capabilities 
that could reach proscribed ranges. After UNSCOM left Iraq 
in December 1998, Iraq would be able once again to create a 
capability to make BM of ranges exceeding 150 km. 
UNSCOM's achievements 
UNSCOM's achievements in accounting for Iraq's proscribed 
programmes are particularly impressive in light of Iraq's 
incomplete cooperation. Despite the substantial resistance that 
UNSCOM faced in Iraq, it successfully accounted for the 
disposition and destruction of large numbers of proscribed 
BM, CBW and associated facilities."' UNSCOM's most 
important achievements were the uncovering of Iraq's BW 
programme and aspects of the CW and proscribed BM 
capabilities that Iraq had tried to hide. UNSCOM assessed its 
results in a report circulated in the Security Council in January 
1999, where it stated that 'notwithstanding the very 
considerable obstacles placed by Iraq in the way of the 
Ul Ibid. 
'" Cleminson (2003); UNMOVIC report (2004), Appendix Ill. A. 
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Commission's work, a great deal has been achieved in: 
verifying Iraq's frequently revised declarations; accounting for 
its proscribed weapons capabilities; and in destroying, 
removing or rendering harmless substantial portions of that 
capability .' 153 
The disarmament achievements in Iraq between 1991 and 
1998 appear to have had lasting implications beyond 
UNSCOM's departure, as no proscribed weapons or 
capabilities have been found after the war in 2003. However, 
UNSCOM had not been able to report that Iraq was 
completely disarmed of all proscribed capabilities, weapons 
and items. Therefore, at the time the disarmament regime was 
widely considered to have failed. 
UNSCOM has been considered as highly successful in 
accounting for Iraq's disarmament of proscribed weapons and 
capabilities, and even exercised a positive impact on Iraq's 
disarmament because of their investigative skills, while the UN 
disarmament regime as a whole was considered to have failed 
to achieve the objective of complete disarmament.'" The key 
to this apparent contradiction lies with the unresolved 
disarmament questions that emerged during UNSCOM's 
accounting for Iraq's proscribed weapons and capabilities. 
Complete disarmament required more than accounting for the 
number of proscribed weapons and items that had been 
destroyed. UNSCOM's task was to account for Iraq's 
compliance with Resolution 687, i.e. complete disarmament of 
CBW, proscribed BM and capabilities and the demand that 
Iraq fully cooperated with UNSCOM. 
For UNSCOM, assessing whether Iraq had been completely 
disarmed required an analysis of the probability that Iraq had 
enabled UNSCOM to verify Iraq's declarations and 
destruction of all proscribed weapons, items and programmes. 
This analysis would be based on mapping Iraq's cooperation 
tn UNSCOM (1999), Section on Disannamenr. 
'"For example Black (1999). 
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with UNSCOM in terms of providing full declarations and 
enabling the organization to verify Iraq's statements, and 
assessing the scope of UNSCOM's quantitative accounting for 
the destruction of all proscribed weapons and items in light of 
the level of Iraqi cooperation. 
As argued in the previous chapter, although the 
disarmament regime's objective was 'complete' Iraqi NBC 
disarmament, the disarmament effort did not aim to remove 
everything that could enable Iraq to re-establish proscribed 
capabilities. The disarmament effort focused on weapons, 
equipment and materials that had been acquired for or used in 
the proscribed programmes. The disarmament regime did not 
attempt to 'remove' the scientific and technological knowledge 
('software') that had been established over decades of 
research. Even if UNSCOM fully verified the destruction of all 
these items, Iraq's proscribed infrastructures would be 
eliminated but there would remain a considerable risk that the 
proscribed capabilities could be rebuilt. 
UNSCOM could not be certain that their accounting had 
included all of Iraq's proscribed capabilities and weapons. 
Iraq's partial declarations about its proscribed weapons, 
programmes and capabilities increased this uncertainty. For 
example, Iraq never provided a complete account of its BW 
programme and failed to disclose all aspects of its CW and 
proscribed BM programmes. Iraq declared what its leaders 
believed UNSCOM was already aware of. As UNSCOM's 
investigations discovered more about Iraq's proscribed 
weapons and programmes, Iraq gradually admitted to 
capabilities and activities that had been omitted from the 
previous declarations. This pattern was discernable from the 
outset in 1991. Because the outside world knew a fair amount 
about Iraq's CW and BM after the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars, 
Iraq declared some information about their CW and the BM 
programmes in the early stages. However, it would take 
several years of UNSCOM investigations before Iraq admitted 
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to its BW programme and aspects of Iraq's CW and BM 
weapons and programmes that were initially omitted. 
Iraq's general cooperation with UNSCOM was shaped by 
the Iraqi regime's assessment that such cooperation could 
achieve desirable objectives for Iraq. Iraq retained information 
about the most recent and advanced achievements in all 
proscribed programmes. However, there were distinct patterns 
in Iraq's declarations about the CBW and BM programmes. 
Iraq's disclosures about these programmes and weapons 
varied significantly between the CW, BW and BM areas. Iraq 
denied the offensive BW programme until July 1995, when 
this was admitted after UNSCOM had gathered various 
indications of such a programme. Even after this point, out of 
the three areas Iraq was more reluctant to provide UNSCOM 
witl1 information about the BW programme. 
In a report to the Security Council submitted in April 1997, 
UNSCOM's chairman Ekeus stated: 'not much is unknown 
about Iraq's retained proscribed weapons capabilities. 
However, what is still not accounted for cannot be 
neglected.''" The unsolved questions about Iraq's proscribed 
capabilities had crncial implications for UNSCOM and the 
Security Council's level of confidence in the completeness and 
accuracy of Iraq's declarations. This included long-standing 
concerns as to whether certain proscribed items or weapons 
had been retained by Iraq, or whether information about 
Iraq's proscribed capabilities was withheld to make OMV less 
effective. Iraq's documented efforts to subvert UNSCOM's 
disarmament accounting, and the fact that UNSCOM had not 
received evidence enabling it to verify that all of Iraq's 
proscribed weapons were destroyed and proscribed 
programmes fully dismantled, fuelled these concerns."' 
UNSCOM's effort to verify Iraq's disarmament produced 
information that influenced its assessment of the probability 
w Cockburn and Cockburn {2002), p. 265. 
~_,; UNSCOM {1999), Section on Disarmament. 
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that Iraq was fully disarming of proscribed weapons and 
capabilities. UNSCOM discovered several omissions in Iraq's 
declarations, and identified the extent to which Iraq offered 
evidence that enabled UNSCOM to independently verify 
Iraq's declarations. In this process, UNSCOM could assess the 
level of Iraq's cooperation with its accounting and auditing. 
The level of Iraq's cooperation was important for assessing the 
credibility of Iraqi claims, and the degree of confidence 
UNSCOM had in whether its findings were likely to cover all 
relevant aspects of Iraq's disarmament of CBW and proscribed 
missiles. Therefore, these issues were fundamentally important 
for UNSCOM in answering whether or not Iraq could be 
considered completely disarmed. 
UNSCOM's confidence in Iraq's declarations decreased 
when the agency learned that Iraq had managed to retain 
significant amounts of CBW and production equipment and 
secretly destroyed these in the summer of 1991. Iraq admitted 
to UNSCOM that it had been decided in 1991 that Iraq 
would submit partial declarations as part of a strategy aiming 
to retain substantial prohibited weapons and capabilities. 157 
This illegally undertaken destruction was difficult for 
UNSCOM to verify years later, particularly in terms of how 
many proscribed weapons had been destroyed, because of the 
difficulties in recovering adequate and quantifiable evidence. 
As a result of Iraq's incomplete cooperation and subversive 
efforts, UNSCOM was never able to establish a fully verified 
baseline of Iraq's proscribed weapons, items and capabilities 
against which Iraq's disarmament efforts could be measured. 
Unless Iraq declared all aspects of its proscribed programmes, 
UNSCOM could not be certain that all proscribed capabilities 
had been destroyed. Iraq's incomplete cooperation gave rise to 
a number of uncertainties in UNSCOM's accounting, and was 
perceived to increase the risk that Iraq was retaining 
capabilities in order to re-establish the proscribed capabilities 
LP Ibid. 
DISARJ.iiNG IRAQ? 79 
at a later stage. Significant elements of Iraq's proscribed 
capabilities were never located or destroyed. For example, the 
manuals that had been used in agent production (so-called 
'cook-books') were never found. Another concern was that 
the scientific teams that had worked in the proscribed 
programmes were maintained intact after 1991. 158 
Iraq's incomplete cooperation and subversive efforts 
strongly affected UNSCOM and the Security Council's 
confidence in the scope of Iraq's disarmament and the 
resulting impact on the proscribed capabilities. Charles 
Duelfer, former deputy executive chairman of UNSCOM, 
assessed that 
On a technical level ... [UNSCOM] accomplished a lot in 
the face of a very difficult opponent. Iraq, as it turns out, 
clearly wanted to retain some portion of its capabilities ... 
UNSCOM caused Iraq to get rid of a lot of these weapons. 
Percentage-wise, we will never know if it was seventy 
'h . 159 percent, e1g ty percent, nmety percent ... 
As Due!fer suggests, it is difficult to assess the scope and 
impact of UNSCOM's accounting on Iraq's proscribed 
programmes and capabilities, because there is still no complete 
picture against which UNSCOM's verified results can be 
measured. 
Iraq's limited cooperation, and specifically the subversive 
efforts between 1991 and August 1995, had crucial 
implications for UNSCOM's confidence in the scope and 
accuracy of Iraq's declarations that formed the basis of the 
disarmament accounting. In UNSCOM's overall assessment of 
Iraq's disarmament in 1999, the agency evaluated the 
15 ~ Author's interview with Cees Wolterbeek (2003); author's interview with 
Ekeus (2003). 
l.N Yale Oral History Project interview with Duelfer, p. 64. 
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credibility of Iraqi declarations by assessing the evidence Iraq 
had offered to substantiate its claims. 
Without full Iraqi cooperation the disarmament regime 
would be unable to verify complete Iraqi disarmament. Iraq 
could not be demonstrated to have completely disarmed by 
UNSCOM unless the Iraqi regime demonstrably decided to 
comply with Resolution 687. 160 A totalitarian government in a 
sovereign country had infinitely more possibilities to hide 
items and information than UNSCOM's hope of uncovering 
Iraq's hiding places. It was not impossible that Iraq could have 
retained proscribed weapons or items, or limited its 
declarations about proscribed capabilities. 
The question of Iraq's intentions was at the core of Security 
Council members' concerns about the incomplete 
disarmament accounting. For countries suspecting that Iraq 
intended to later rebuild proscribed capabilities, the residual 
risk posed by the unresolved disarmament questions 
overshadowed the substantial disarmament achievements. The 
disarmament regime was considered an instrument that could 
hopefully remove, or at least contain, the risk that Iraq could 
retain or rebuild proscribed weapons and programmes. 
The Security Council's concerns about Iraq's intentions 
became increasingly obvious as the outstanding disarmament 
issues remained unresolved. After a Security Council 
emergency meeting in November 1997 UNSCOM was 
encouraged to focus on so-called 'key' disarmament issues. If 
Iraq would help UNSCOM to settle these specific questions, 
that would encourage overall confidence in Iraq's intentions. 
This could, in turn, make other outstanding verification issues 
seem less disquieting. The logic of this approach was primarily 
political, because it focused on Iraqi intentions rather than 
numerical verification of complete disarmament of Iraq's 
proscribed weapons and items. Despite this more limited 
approach, Iraq's cooperation deteriorated further (as a result 
~~n Author's imerview with Taylor (2004). 
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of the impression that it was the policy of the United States 
that sanctions would only be lifted as a result of Iraqi regime 
change). 
Once UNSCOM had left Iraq in late 1998, it was very 
difficult to obtain reliable (or verifiable) information about 
subsequent NBC-related developments. 161 A substantial cause 
for concern in the longer-term was that Iraq could rebuild 
proscribed capabilities. Any such efforts would be affected by 
UNSCOM and the IAEA's dismantling of Iraq's NBC 
infrastructures of 1991. However, it was difficult to assess the 
impact of UNSCOM's substantial disarmament on the risk 
that the proscribed capabilities could be rebuilt. The focus on 
the outstanding disarmament questions, which were described 
as the 'greatest threat' by the last UNSCOM chairman, 
Richard Butler, resulted in rather bleak assessments of the 
impact of the disarmament regime in Iraq. 162 
'"'Martin Woollacott (2004). 
"'Richard Butler (2000). 
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Chapter 6 
Ongoing Monitoring and 
Verification" 
As argued in the previous chapter, the destruction of Iraq's 
existing proscribed weapons and infrastructures was not 
irreversible, as destroyed capabilities could be rebuilt. The 
Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) system was 
intended to enable UNSCOM to ascertain whether Iraq was 
rebuilding proscribed capabilities, and UNSCOM would in 
turn inform the Security Council whether Iraq was complying 
with the disarmament objectives of Resolution 687. In this 
chapter, the OMV system and its achievements will be 
examined in more depth. First of all we will look at OMV's 
purpose and characteristics, paying particular attention to the 
challenges UNSCOM faced in designing OMV in relation to 
the three proscribed weapon categories. Subsequently, we will 
analyze the role of the OMV system in the political efforts to 
contain Iraq through the UN regime. We will see how OMV 
served as a political instrument to contain the risk that Iraq 
could pose to international security. 
In the original plan for OMV, which was adopted by the 
Security Council by Resolution 715 (1991), the system's 
purpose is defined as: 
~~.~For detailed analyses of OMV, see P:il Aas (1997); or Jonathan Tucker 
(1996). 
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[monitoringJlraq's compliance with its unconditional 
obligation not to use, retain, possess, develop, construct or 
otherwise acquire any weapons or related items prohibited 
under paragraphs 8 and 9 of resolution 687 (1991). Thus, 
monitoring and verification will need to cover not only 
military but also civilian sites, facilities, material and other 
items that could be used or activities that could be involved in 
contravention of Iraq's obligations under resolution 687 
(1991 ).'" 
The OMV system was to be implemented immediately after 
the Security Council passed Resolution 715 on 11 October 
1991. While UNSCOM's disarmament accounting would 
clearly not have been completed when OMV was intended to 
be established, it would be important to ascertain whether 
Iraq was rebuilding proscribed capabilities while the original 
proscribed infrastructures were destroyed."' The OMV system 
was intended to be operational for as long as the Security 
Council considered necessary. However, Iraq refused to accept 
the OMV system until 26 November 1993, in spite of its 
obligations under Resolution 687. 
The OMV system was intended to enable UNSCOM to 
detect Iraqi efforts to retain dual-capable equipment in 
monitored sites, or make use of dual-capable civilian facilities 
to restart production of CBW. By increasing the probability 
that efforts to rebuild proscribed capabilities would be 
detected, OMV could enable the Security Council to deter Iraq 
from undertaking such efforts. 
Monitoring Iraq's compliance with the wide-ranging 
objectives of Resolution 687 was a potentially vast task. 
Because UNSCOM had finite monitoring and information-
processing resources, OMV was focused on detecting signs of 
proscribed weapons production. Other rypes of activities 
164 UN Secretary General (1991), Paragraph 3. 
l"-l Ibid., Paragraph 4. 
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prohibited by Resolution 687, such as research and 
development, were less prioritized. The focus on detecting 
proscribed weapons production was in line with the 
disarmament regime's main purpose- ascertaining whether 
Iraq posed a threat to international security in terms of 
proscribed weapons or capabilities. This focusing of efforts 
also made OMV's information gathering and assessment more 
manageable. 
In setting up and running OMV, UNSCOM drew from 
world-leading expertise, cutting-edge information-gathering 
technologies, and unprecedented rights of access. The agency 
used its 'anytime, anywhere' right to inspect any facility and 
request any information that would help to verify Iraq's 
declarations. OMV combined different technologies, regular 
on-site inspections and no-notice inspections at sites that were 
not under regular monitoring, in order to undertake both 
intensive and more broadly focused monitoring. The purpose 
of the focused monitoring was to detect (and rhus, deter) 
diversion of specific dual-capable equipment or resources, 
while surprise inspections and aerial photography (from U2 
planes) was intended to similarly deter Iraq from undertaking 
proscribed activities or retaining dual-capable items in sites 
that were not regularly monitored. This combination was 
intended to increase the risk of non-compliance in monitored 
sites, which could enable production of proscribed missiles 
and agents, as well as establish a risk that proscribed activities 
outside monitored sites would be detected."" 
OMV: characteristics 
OMV was designed to function as an auditing system. It was 
set up as an integrated system that focused individually on the 
biological, chemical and proscribed BM areas. OMV provided 
UNSCOM with a widely encompassing overview that made it 
~~r, Author's interview ·with Smidovich (2003 b). 
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increasingly unlikely that attempts to reestablish proscribed 
capabilities in monitored sites would not be detected. Put 
simply, UNSCOM's verification of Iraq's declarations 
consisted of comparing the content with information gathered 
from on-site inspections, interviews with Iraqi personnel 
connected to the proscribed programmes, and relevant 
information submitted from UN member stares. 167 
UNSCOM assessed a variety of indicators gathered through 
inspections and monitoring instruments (such as interviews, 
document searches, air samplers, U2 flights, sampling 
equipment, satellite imagery, ground-penetrating radar) and 
information submitted by friendly governments to verify Iraq's 
claims about the monitored sites. 1'" This combination enabled 
the agency to crosscheck indications of anomalous activities, 
to ensure that suspicion was warranted before an explanation 
was demanded from Iraq. Some of OMV's most useful tools 
were intrusive on-sire inspections, import control, tracing of 
dual-capable materials and equipment, and imagery from 
satellites or U2 over-flights. 169 
One of the most important lessons from OMV was the 
successful way in which UNSCOM combined different 
capabilities to an overall system. 170 The OMV system consisted 
of a complex of different means and technologies that would, 
as a whole and over time, enable UNSCOM to detect 
anomalies from the normal activities on the monitored sites. 171 
Several of the tools and technologies used in OMV were being 
discussed in relation to international arms control and non-
proliferation regimes, but UNSCOM was the first agency to 
utilize these and newly emerging technologies. 172 For 
international non-proliferation regimes, it would be difficult 
'"' UNSCOl'vl (1999). 
16~ Aas (1997). 
'"'' Aas (1997). 
""Barton (1998). 
,_, UNSCOM (1999), Section on OMV. 
~"2 Yale Oral History Project interview wirh Smidovich, p. 17. 
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to obtain an agreement to use such intrusive means for 
verification. 
UNSCOM monitored over three hundred sites, with 
different frequencies and imensities. The activity of all of these 
sites had to be declared at regular intervals, and these 
declarations would then be verified by UNSCOM inspectors. 
The frequency and style of monitoring were determined 
according to the type of ea pabilities and activities taking place 
in each site. UNSCOM focused its most intrusive monitoring 
instruments and inspector teams to sites that posed the highest 
risk of converting rapidly to undertake proscribed activities. 
Sites that posed a smaller risk in terms of contributing to 
proscribed activities were primarily monitored through 
technical means. 173 As we shall see, OMV's efforts were 
focused on those sites that could be rapidly reconfigured in 
order to undertake proscribed activities, thus distributing the 
risk of detection according to the possibility that facilities 
could contribute to proscribed weapons production. 
Iraq's efforts to hide equipment and continue proscribed 
programmes berween 1991 and August 1995 increased the 
importance of having a system in place capable of identifying 
the sites to which dual-capable items or resources could have 
been moved. If proscribed items or activities were forced 
underground, this would probably constitute a smaller 
potential threat than if resources in the monitored sites were 
diverted for proscribed purposes in situ, because such 
clandestine sites were unlikely to possess production 
capabilities that existed in monitored facilities.'" 
UNSCOM arranged 'surprise' inspections to ascertain 
whether proscribed activities emerged outside the regularly 
monitored sites. 175 These other sites could be identified by 
n Author's interview with Smidovich {2003a). 
17~ Author's interview with Smidovich (2003 b). 
m In one sense, these were betrer described as 'very short notice' inspections 
than 'surprise inspections', because the Iraqis soon suspected which sites 
were to be inspected because of clues such as the direction in which 
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information provided by friendly governments, but 
increasingly such surprise inspections were triggered by 
information that emerged during UNSCOM's inspection 
activities or U2 overflights. Such inspections added to OMV's 
deterrent aspect, and increased Iraq's risk of hiding dual-
capable items or activities. 
In 1996, an 'export-import mechanism' was established, 
obliging UN member-states to notify UNSCOM and the IAEA 
of all exports to Iraq of specified items. 17' The so-called 
'export/import mechanism' enabled UNSCOM to track and 
monitor any equipment and materials entering Iraq that could 
be used for proscribed activities."' This system was useful for 
identifying and tracking imports, procurement networks and 
end destinations for these items. However, the system was 
somewhat hampered by the fact that some countries failed to 
declare export of items to Iraq. m In addition, it only covered 
items on the open market. The size of the Iraqi borders meant 
that it was impossible to prevent black market trade or 
smuggling e.g. via Jordan or Syria. UNSCOM uncovered 
several attempts of illegal procurement. 
In OMV's mandate, established in the OMV plan and 
Resolution 715 (1991), there was no differentiation or guides 
to prioritize among the range of proscribed activities that 
could be undertaken in Iraq. However, UNSCOM focused the 
OMV system to enable detection of proscribed weapons 
production. A more focused approach warranted a higher 
level of confidence than a widely cast but thinly spread OMV 
system. This was based on the view that it was more 
UNSCOM inspectors were travelling, the composition of the team (the skills 
of the inspectors), and other details indicating where the next inspection was 
headed. 
""Arms Control Today (1997). 
"'UNSCOM (1999). 
n> For the example of the import of ballistic missiles equipment front Russia 
uncovered in December 1995, see Vladimir Orlov and William C. Potter 
(1998). 
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important to be able to detect efforts to rebuild proscribed 
capabilities than to detect any type of activity prohibited by 
Resolution 6 87. 
The degree of Iraqi cooperation was important for the 
targeting and operation of these monitoring systems. For 
example, UNSCOM's information about Iraq's proscribed 
capabilities was used to target OMV on certain 'bottlenecks' 
rather than trying to cover every site and equipment in equal 
measure. 179 Another example was UNSCOM's dependence on 
using rights of access that had been agreed between Iraq and 
the Security Council in 1991. Although Iraq had accepted that 
the OMV system would be set up with such wide rights of 
access, the Iraqi regime repeatedly tried to restrict UNSCOM's 
access to facilities and information. 
Provision of intelligence information from foreign 
governments was important for UNSCOM, particularly in the 
years before the monitoring system was fully operational. 1so 
lraq's limited declarations increased the importance of such 
information supplied from friendly governments in support of 
UNSCOM's efforts. Because the agency received information 
from different countries and could follow up this information 
on the ground, it was able to effectively assess and use the 
intelligence. 1" 1 Over time, OMV evolved to a system whose 
information-gathering and analytical capabilities on issues 
concerning Iraq's proscribed programmes, capabilities and 
compliance with Resolution 687 were unequalled. 
The limitations of particular monitoring instruments meant 
that there were some gaps in the scope of the monitoring 
system. The deterrent impact that OMV could distribute is 
likely to have concentrated on production activities that were 
clearly detectable by the OMV system. It is therefore prudent 
to assume that OMV might have exercised a smaller deterrent 
""UNSCOM (1999). 
mu Author's interview with Kelly (2003a). 
1 ~ 1 Tim Trevan (1999); author's interview with EkCus (2003). 
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to activities that were less detectable (primarily research and 
development). However, it is possible that if the Iraqi 
counterpart was not aware of the limitations of UNSCOM's 
monitoring instruments, the OMV system could have 
exercised a more general deterrent impact than the sum of the 
technical monitoring capabilities. 
Underpinning assumptions 
The OMV system depended on access and Iraqi cooperation, 
as demanded by the Security Council in Resolution 687. From 
the outset, UNSCOM assumed that Iraq would comply with 
Resolution 687's demands, and provide complete and 
verifiable declarations. Another assumption was that Iraq 
would be persuaded, by the incentive of lifting the sanctions 
and the risk of detection and punishment, to refrain from 
undertaking any proscribed activities. 
However, it turned out that Iraq's limited cooperation and 
compliance contradicted these assumptions. As argued in the 
previous chapter, UNSCOM was unable to fully verify Iraqi 
disarmament due to the lack of Iraqi cooperation. UNSCOM's 
inability to verify Iraq's complete disarmament made the task 
of monitoring more complex and demanding than what 
would otherwise have been the case. An UNSCOM report 
from 1995 argues that 
Uncertainties relating to the accuracy or completeness of this 
accounting wilJ consequently lead to uncertainties as to 
whether the ongoing monitoring and verification system is 
indeed monitoring aH the materials, items, and equipment 
which should be monitored."' 
Although disarmament and monitoring were designed as 
distinct efforts, they turned out to be of mutual benefit to 
UNSCOM in coping with Iraq's incomplete declarations of its 
'"' UNSCOM (1995e). 
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proscribed facilities, capabilities and programmes. As 
UNSCOM mapped facilities that were capable of contributing 
to proscribed programmes, anomalies were discovered about 
Iraq's declarations. Moreover, on-site inspections could 
uncover information about proscribed or dual-capable sites as 
well as capacities that had not been declared by Iraq. 183 
Incrementally, UNSCOM discovered information about issues 
that had been omitted irom previous Iraqi declarations. 
An important question was whether the monitoring system 
could detect significant diversion from legitimate 
undertakings, without first having fully mapped and verified 
Iraq's proscribed capabilities. By combining Iraqi declarations 
with identifying which Iraqi facilities contained dual-capable 
resources, UNSCOM was able to create a monitoring system 
that covered the facilities and items that could be diverted to 
create a large-scale proscribed production capability. 
UNSCOM could not guarantee that this system could catch all 
potential infractions, but was nonetheless confident that over 
time it would detect systematic or large-scale violations of 
Iraq's obligations not to rebuild proscribed capabilities.'"' 
The monitoring 'architectures' in each area were configured 
according to information provided by Iraq's declarations and 
UNSCOM's own mapping of site capabilities. UNSCOM's 
ability to maximize the probability of detection varied 
between the proscribed activities, as a result of different 
proscribed production processes and its varying amount of 
information about Iraq's proscribed capabilities. In the 
January 1999 report, UNSCOM argued that: 
The extent of Iraq's cooperation is the key determinant for 
the level of OMV procedures employed, and the resulting 
confidence in the system. Iraq has provided varying degrees of 
cooperation since 1991. The better the information and access 
Ji:_\ Author's interview with Smidovich (2003b). 
104 Author's imerview with EkCus (2003); author's interview with Kellv 
(2003b). 
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provided by Iraq, the less intrusive the OMV procedures and 
the higher the confidence i11 the resulting assessments of Iraq's 
1. 18,) camp tance. 
OMV's focus on the risk that dual-capable equipment could 
be diverted for production of CBW agents or missiles of 
proscribed ranges required adapting the monitoring 
approaches to the features of the sites covered by the system. 
In the BM area, OMV's main challenge consisted of 
checking that permitted BM production was not diverted to 
produce proscribed missiles, and to check that the produced 
BM were not subsequently changed to enable these to reach 
proscribed ranges. Before 1991, Iraq relied on imports for the 
more technologically demanding components of BM, such as 
specific engine parts and guidance and control instruments. 
However, in 1998 UNSCOM assessed that Iraq was able to 
indigenously manufacture, from indigenous and foreign parts, 
a limited number of Scud-type engines and missiles. 
UNSCOM decided to concentrate monitoring on 'bottlenecks' 
that had to be overcome in order to produce proscribed BM, 
rather than trying to cover any equipment that could 
contribute to proscribed BM research and development."' 
In the chemical area, numerous dual-capable resources and 
equipment tl1roughout a number of industrial and research 
facilities were placed under UNSCOM's monitoring. A far 
greater number of facilities, of a diverse nature, had to be 
monitored in comparison with the more limited number of 
BM sites. 
However, the most widely encompassing monitoring system 
was established in the biological area. This was a result of the 
large number of sites with dual-capable equipment that could 
be diverted for proscribed BW purposes, and Iraq's 
incomplete declarations. 
"' UNSCOM (1999). 
"" UNSCOM (1999). 
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OMV architectures 
The design of the OMV system faced a number of challenges 
in ascertaining whether 'dual-capable' equipment was diverted 
for proscribed purposes. Because Iraq's industries were of a 
relatively limited scale, the information gathered by 
monitoring dual-capable equipment could be managed and 
analysed by UNSCOM. UNSCOM targeted on-site 
monitoring instruments and decided how often on-site 
inspections would be undertaken according to the rate at 
which specific facilities could be converted for proscribed 
purposes. UNSCOM's inspections were undertaken within the 
time it would take to convert the dual-capable resources. At 
the same time, in order to enhance the deterrent influence 
from the OMV system, UNSCOM inspectors attempted to 
devise unpredictable patterns and approaches to on-site 
auditing inspections. 
The monitoring in the BM area posed distinct challenges. 
As previously explained, the decision to limit the range of 
Iraq's BM to less than 150 km was governed by political 
considerations. There are no clear-cut technical characteristics 
that distinguish research or production of missiles with a 
range of more than 150 km from missiles that can reach 
slightly below that range. UNSCOM was not able to develop 
a definition that considered the impact of all relevant variables 
(including weather conditions) on the range of BM's. 
However, some unequivocal technological and physical 
missile features that would increase its yield over the 
permitted range were identified and used to distinguish 
proscribed from permitted missiles. 
The difference between legal and illegal activities was not 
always clearly identifiable. For example, UNSCOM found 
some indications that Iraq pursued research that would also 
be applicable to proscribed missiles, but these activities were 
kept within the 'dual-capable' realm and could not be 
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determined as being 'proscribed activities'."' Although several 
suspicious findings and possible violations were detected 
through OMV, UNSCOM never reported a clear violation of 
Resolution 687 to the Security Council. 1"' 
OMV and containment 
The OMV system was an important element of the political 
'containment' strategy that became associated with the UN 
disarmament regime. Through OMV, UNSCOM enabled the 
Security Council to continuously assess whether Iraq 
reconstituted proscribed capabilities. This system was also 
meant to enable the Security Council to deter Iraq from any 
such attempts. This deterrent impact was based on a high risk 
of detection and a high probability of punishment if any 
proscribed activities or items were discovered. 
Notwithstanding the remaining uncertainties about Iraq's 
disarmament, OMV appears to have facilitated the ability to 
detect attempts to undertake prohibited activities in monitored 
facilities. UNSCOM primarily sought to achieve a direct 
deterrent against activities in monitored facilities, and a 'spill-
over' deterrent to prevent the emergence of proscribed 
activities outside these facilities. 
OMV's deterrent potential was underpinned by the 
commitment of the Security Council to punish material 
breaches of Resolution 687. Iraq's level of cooperation with 
UNSCOM appeared to be shaped by the Iraqi regime's 
perception of the probability that the Security Council would 
punish denials of access to sites and information. The high 
threshold of military punishment may have limited the scope 
of OMV's potential deterrent impact. For example, UNSCOM 
detected evidence that Iraqi scientists had conducted 
calculations that could be useful for making ballistic missiles 
1 ~7 Author's interview with Corinne Heraud (2004). 
ui~< Author's interview with Mitrokhin (2004 a). 
94 FORSVARSSTUDIER 4/2004 
of proscribed ranges. 1"' Such violations were not considered 
grave enough to warrant military strikes by the Security 
Council. However, for UNSCOM this was disturbing because 
it implied that Iraq could undertake other similar proscribed 
activities with relative impunity. 190 
It is difficult to assess to what extent OMV might have 
exercised a deterrent impact on Iraqi decision-making. Until 
we have better knowledge of Iraq's policies between 1991 and 
1998, it is difficult to draw final conclusions about OMV's 
precise impact. It is possible that Iraq maintained activities 
that could contribute to proscribed capabilities at a level 
where these activities could not be clearly defined as illegal. As 
previously argued, given the dual-capable nature of many 
aspects of CBW and proscribed missiles development and 
production, drawing the line between legal and proscribed 
activities was not always straightforward. 1' 1 
First of all, proscribed actions that were prevented by the 
OMV system have not been identified- indeed, this would be 
difficult to detect and prove. However, UNSCOM discovered 
that Iraq did continue proscribed R&D activities as well as 
proscribed procurement. Between 1994 and 1998, UNSCOM 
discovered several instances of non-compliance with the OMV 
system, such as failures to declare relevant activities and items 
to UNSCOM, and attempts to import proscribed items 
without notifying UNSCOM. These activities were clearly not 
deterred by OMV, but the fact that they were detected might 
subsequently have increased OMV's deterrent impact. 
UNSCOM uncovered attempts to divert dual-use capabilities 
from permitted and declared activities, but no evidence of 
development of actual CBW in the monitored sites. After the 
war in 2003, no information has emerged suggesting that Iraq 
managed to subvert the OMV system by systematically 
169 Author's interview with Smidovich (2003 b). 
~~·)Author's interview with KeJly (2003 b). 
1 ~ 1 Author's interview with Heraud (2004). 
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rebuilding or retaining proscribed capabilities in dual-capable 
sites. 
Risk management and OMV 
The OMV system is an interesting example of how the 
attempt to establish a purely technical role to UNSCOM was 
undermined by political realities, such as Iraq's limited 
cooperation. OMV was established as a system monitoring 
whether Iraq complied with the demand to not rebuild 
proscribed ea pabilities. However, as Iraq's non-cooperation 
and subversive efforts became known, an increasingly 
important objective for UNSCOM was that OMV be able to 
deter Iraq from deviating dual-capable resources from their 
legitimate purposes. 
This is reflected in UNSCOM's effort to channel the risk of 
any proscribed activities away from dual-capable facilities to 
clandestine sites. Thus, OMV's purpose shifted from the 
intended auditing role to one of risk management. In fact, it 
could be argued that UNSCOM's attempt to reduce the 
overall risk that the proscribed capabilities could be 
reconstituted by seeking to deny Iraq the possibility to divert 
the dual-capable facilities also minimized the risk that Iraq 
could pose a threat to international security. 
For some Security Council members, concerns about Iraq's 
intentions in relation to the proscribed capabilities increased 
OMV's importance for the effort to contain the threat from 
Iraq through the UN regime. It became clear that Iraq's 
intentions, residual knowledge and dnal-capable resources 
could not be eradicated by the effort to verify complete 
disarmament of proscribed weapons and the associated 
infrastructures. However, OMV enabled UNSCOM to 
ascertain that Iraq did not re-establish these capabilities in a 
way that could threaten international security. As long as 
OMV was underpinned by a credible threat of enforcement, 
Iraq could be deterred from systematic and large-scale efforts 
96 FORSVARSSTUDJER 4/2004 
to re-establish proscribed capabilities. If Iraq's proscribed 
capabilities could not be completely eradicated, these 
capabilities could be kept under control if UNSCOM 
remained in the country."' Thus, the OMV system became 
considered a 'risk management' instrument for this political 
strategy. 
However, some UNSCOM inspectors feared that the 
monitoring system could provide a false sense of security 
unless Iraq's complete disarmament had been verified. 193 This 
rightly points out that UNSCOM's inability to verify complete 
disarmament in Iraq limited the conclusions that could be 
drawn from OMV's findings. The information gathered 
through OMV could not be interpreted as proof of Iraq's 
'continued compliance' with Resolution 687, unless there was 
a verified disarmament baseline against which Iraq's 
compliance could be measured. However, OMV enabled 
UNSCOM to ascertain whether Iraq was rebuilding 
proscribed production capabilities. OMV's role in deterring 
Iraq from rebuilding proscribed production capabilities in 
monitored sites, made the system an important confidence-
building measure even if UNSCOM had not fully verified 
Iraq's complete disarmament. 
192 For more on risk management in international relations, see Christopher 
Coker (2003 ). 
'"' Seelos (1999). 
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Chapter 7 
Coping with the challenges in 
Iraq 
In this chapter, we will examine the way in which UNSCOM 
adapted to the challenges from Iraq's limited cooperation and 
subversive efforts. This will include a brief consideration of 
how UNSCOM and Security Council members perceived 
Iraq's non-cooperative actions. We will then look at the way 
in which UNSCOM adapted its disarmament verification and 
monitoring efforts in order to fulfil its task, despite the 
challenges that emerged in Iraq. 
When UNSCOM became aware of Iraq's limited 
cooperation, the agency had to adapt its disarmament 
accounting and monitoring efforts in order to cope with Iraq's 
behaviour. From the outset in 1991, Iraq attempted to limit 
UNSCOM's access, obstructed its inspections, and concealed 
items and information from the agency. However, the 
unilateral destruction of retained weapons and items in the 
summer of 1991 suggests that Iraq's leaders came to the 
conclusion that UNSCOM's multifaceted investigative 
capabilities substantially increased the risk that clandestine, 
proscribed activities would be detected.'"' 
Nonetheless, Iraq continued to limit its declarations about 
the proscribed capabilities and programmes (including the 
'"' UNSCOM (1999). 
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entire offensive BW programme). Iraq also retained proscribed 
weapons and items and continued prohibited activities in the 
BM area. In addition to the clear cases of Iraqi non-
cooperation, there were other reasons to doubt Iraq's 
intentions to comply with the objectives of Resolution 687. 
For example, Iraq never presented any evidence of a decision 
to destroy the proscribed weapons and capabilities. Nor did 
Iraq implement laws that prohibited legal and natural persons 
from participating in proscribed activities. Over time, a 
pattern of the scope of Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM 
could be discerned. Jonathan Tucker, a former UNSCOM 
inspector, has argued that Iraq tailored their non-cooperative 
actions to a level that, if detected, was unlikely to result in 
military punitive strikes. 195 
UNSCOM required Iraq's cooperation in order to be able 
to fully map Iraq's proscribed programmes, weapons and 
capabilities, verify the destruction of all proscribed items and 
capabilities, and monitor all activities and items that could be 
used to re-establish proscribed capabilities in an optimal 
manner. Therefore, Iraq's limited cooperation had 
implications for UNSCOM's prospect of fulfilling its mandate. 
As explained in chapter three, UNSCOM's initial round of 
verification of Iraq's destruction of proscribed BM, CW and 
items used or acquired for production of proscribed weapons 
took place between 1991 and mid-1994. After Hussein 
Kamel's defection to Jordan in August 1995, the scope of 
Iraq's non-compliance with Resolution 687 was exposed. 
After the Kamel defection, the Iraqi government admitted that 
it had withheld information about their entire offensive BW 
programme as well as other information and materials for the 
purpose of retaining proscribed capabilities. Subsequently, 
UNSCOM's verification efforts became far more skeptical and 
intrusive. UNSCOM developed a far more investigative 
'" Jonathan Tucker (1996). 
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approach to verify Iraq's declarations than had been intended 
or foreseen by the Security Council in 1991. 
The Hussein Kamel defection has raised considerable debate 
- even prior to the war in 2003. At that point, US officials 
started questioning UNSCOM's ability to uncover 
information about Iraq's proscribed programmes and 
disarmament without complete Iraqi cooperation. The 
defection was undoubtedly crucial in uncovering the scope of 
Iraq's non-compliance with Resolution 687. UNSCOM 
realized that Iraq had withheld information, retained 
proscribed capabilities, undertaken unilateral destruction of 
proscribed weapons, and continued proscribed activities in the 
BM area. There is no question that the defection resulted in 
UNSCOM obtaining more information, e.g. about 
weaponization in the BW programme, and confirming a 
number of UNSCOM's suspicions. However, as previously 
explained, UNSCOM had obtained an admission from Iraq 
that an offensive BW programme existed in July 1995, i.e. one 
month before Kamel's defection. In other words, UNSCOM 
had achieved one of its most important discoveries prior to 
this defection. 
After the Hussein Kamel defection, the term 'concealment 
mechanism' was conceived by UNSCOM in reference to a 
number of phenomena that inspectors suspected were 
orchestrated efforts to retain proscribed capabilities by not 
declaring relevant information and items. 
A number of different phenomena were interpreted as being 
part of this 'mechanism', whose most widely documented 
feature was incomplete declarations of proscribed 
programmes, weapons and items. Less is known about the 
second category of subversive actions, namely removing 
proscribed items from facilities and transporting these around 
the country in order to avoid detection. The third element, 
Iraqi counterintelligence efforts targeting UNSCOM in the UN 
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building as well as in Iraq, was perhaps less surprising. 196 
Former !AEA inspector David Kay's claim that Iraq managed 
to penetrate UNSCOM to the extent that Iraq was aware and 
prepared for the upcoming inspections is difficult to prove. In 
many cases, Iraq would be able to narrow down the options 
for inspection when inspectors were traveling to a specific 
area. While there were examples of all three elements that 
have been described between 1991-1998, it remains unknown 
how much of the sum total UNSCOM suspected was in fact 
part of a subversive 'concealment mechanism'. 
Once UNSCOM had verified the content (and noted 
conspicuous omissions) from Iraq's declarations, the so-called 
'concealment mechanism' became the focus of dedicated 
UNSCOM investigations from 1997. In that year, Richard 
Butler assumed his position as UNSCOM's new executive 
chairman. His predecessor, Ekeus, had considered that this 
issue had to be fully investigated in order for UNSCOM to 
ever be able to report to the Security Council that Iraq had 
complied with Resolution 687. 197 UNSCOM's investigations 
into the 'concealment mechanism' included inspections that 
led to increasing confrontations with Iraq and subsequent 
crises over UNSCOM's access to sites in Iraq. 
After the Kamel defection, UNSCOM became more focused 
on key disarmament issues when pursuing its broadly 
encompassing mandate. Its approach to verify Iraqi claims, 
and investigate gaps and apparent omissions in the Iraqi 
declarations, also became increasingly intrusive. UNSCOM's 
adaptations to the realities on the ground in Iraq gradually 
changed the agency's efforts from what had originally been 
intended. UNSCOM underwent two main changes. First, 
UNSCOM gradually adopted a far more investigative 
approach than the Security Council had originally intended. 1''" 
I'll> Author's interview with Smidovich (2004). 
H
7 Author's interview with Ekeus (2003). 
'" UNSCOM (1999). 
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In response to Iraq's subversion and partial declarations, 
UNSCOM's investigations became far more scrutinizing of the 
evidence proving Iraq's claims. In addition, UNSCOM's own 
efforts to verify Iraqi claims drew on forensic tools such as 
ground-penetrating radar, digging up proscribed items from 
where they had been buried along with other items, 
uncovering archives from buildings that had been demolished 
during the Gulf War, searches to recover proscribed items 
from rivers, computer searches etc. 
The second change in UNSCOM's activities was that the 
executive chairman had to undertake an increasing amount of 
diplomatic efforts in order to secure UNSCOM's ability to 
perform its task in Iraq. The Security Council was reluctant to 
escalate the responses to Iraq's non-cooperation and non· 
compliance to military strikes, with the result that UNSCOM 
engaged in seeking political solutions with Iraq. UNSCOM's 
executive chairman had to engage directly with Iraq and the 
governments of the Security Council members in order to 
secure UNSCOM's right of access and to secure support in the 
Council for these rights. Charles Due!fer argued that 
UNSCOM ultimately ended up 'at the junction of technical 
and political worlds' because of the impact of Iraq's limited 
cooperation on the agency's role in the disarmament regime. 199 
What started out as a technical verification agency thus ended 
up doing much more than pure technical accounting.100 
As long as Iraq offered a basic level of cooperation, in terms 
of submitting declarations and allowing verification of the 
claims therein, UNSCOM's intrusive investigative capabilities 
enabled the agency to obtain information that Iraq had 
attempted to hide. Even if Iraq's cooperation was partial, 
UNSCOM's scrutinizing verification efforts (drawing from a 
range of investigative means) proved highly capable of 
""Dueller (2002). 
~~1~ Author's interview with Buchanan (2004). 
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mapping Iraq's past achievements and capabilities.201 The 
investigations of omissions or n1islcading statements in Iraq's 
declarations proved to be very rewarding. 
Iraq's limited cooperation had substantial impacts on 
OMV's approach and focus. As argued in the previous 
chapter, an important objective was to deny Iraq the 
possibility of diverting dual-capable resources on civilian sites, 
and simultaneously increase the risk of diverting activities to 
clandestine sites."' UNSCOM monitored Iraq's responses to 
UNSCOM's activities, such as attempts to divert items from 
monitored sites, to assess whether Iraq was systematically 
moving such items to undisclosed sites.2111 
As previously argued, another impact of UNSCOM's 
inability to confirm Iraq's disarmament was OMV's increasing 
importance as a tool to certify (and deter) Iraqi efforts to 
rebuild proscribed capabilities. OMV enabled UNSCOM to 
continuously update the Security Council whether Iraq 
attempted to rebuild proscribed capabilities. Iraq's partial 
cooperation had a number of implications for the intended 
role of the OMV system and the confidence UNSCOM had in 
OMV's scope and coverage. These implications centered on 
the question whether complete disarmament- a so-called 
'zero baseline'- was necessary for OMV to ascertain whether 
or not Iraq remained disarmed. 
However, as was argued in the previous chapter, OMV had 
a positive impact on the disarmament investigation. Because 
UNSCOM's efforts in disarmament and monitoring used 
similar instruments and ran simultaneously, these two 
activities reinforced each other to a larger extent than had 
originally been imagined. Information gathered through 
monitoring turned out to be useful for UNSCOM's 
disarmament investigations, because this provided information 
'"'Tucker (2002). 
"m Author's interview with Smidovich (2003a). 
:'
1
> Author's interview wirh Smidovich (2003 a). 
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about Iraqi capabilities and detected suspicious sites that 
could be thoroughly inspected. Thus, despite its dependence 
on the disarmament process, OMV assisted with the separate 
disarmament investigation. 
In contrast to UNSCOM, the Security Council was unable 
to adapt its enforcement tools or policies in the face of Iraq's 
incomplete cooperation. UNSCOM's ability to implement its 
rights in Iraq depended on the commitment of the Security 
Council, which was also crucial for Iraq's willingness to 
cooperate with the agency. During the seven years that this 
regime was in place, UNSCOM's executive chairman Ekeus 
considered that both Iraq and UNSCOM continuously refined 
their methods to prevail over each other's tactics."' However, 
UNSCOM's achievements in adapting to Iraq's policy of 
partial cooperation were not matched at the enforcement 
level. 
Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM varied substantially, in 
reflection of the Iraqi regime's perception of the Security 
Council's commitment to fully achieving NBC disarmament in 
Iraq."" Rolf Ekeus has described Iraq's main political strategy 
as discrediting UNSCOM and their work in order to drive a 
wedge between UNSCOM and the Security Council. Iraq 
exploited the increasing divisions between the technical and 
the political elements of the disarmament regime by exploiting 
the differences of opinion in the Security Council. As these 
differences emerged more clearly, the political element of the 
disarmament regime became unable to pursue the 
disarmament objectives set down in 1991. 
Ultimately, the politicisation of UNSCOM's activities 
undermined the basic roles of UNSCOM as stipulated in 
Resolution 687. Charles Duelfer, former deputy executive 
chairman of UNSCOM, has argued that: 
"M Author's interview with EkCus (2003). 
'"'Tucker (1996). 
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The dynamics between Iraq and the Security Council, with the 
weapons inspectors inbetween, proved inconsistent with the 
objective of forcing Iraqi disarmament. Immediately after 
inspectors arrived in Iraq, Baghdad began a pattern of only 
partially complying with Resolution 687 and resting the will 
of UNSCOM, the !AEA, and the Security CounciL The 
response was tepid enough to convince Iraq that it could 
obstruct inspections without triggering a military response.206 
Duelfer further argued that Iraq realized already in 1991 that 
the Security Council would not easily resort to military 
enforcement to secure compliance with Resolution 687. The 
differences among Security Council members on the necessity 
to achieve complete disarmament in Iraq, and the gradually 
increasing importance of other political concerns (such as the 
humanitarian consequences of the sanctions), enabled Iraq to 
further deepen the differences of opinion in the Security 
CounciL 
In 1998, after Iraq had accused UNSCOM of serving the 
interests of the United States first and foremost, UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan traveled to Iraq to negotiate directly with 
Saddam Hussein. Later that year the UN Secretary General 
proposed to undertake a comprehensive review of UNSCOM, 
which undermined UNSCOM's role in the disarmament 
regime by equaling their position to that of Iraq as parties in a 
dispute. 207 The inability of the Security Council to maintain 
cohesion and remain committed to the objective of complete 
disarmament undermined the deterrent impact of the 
disarmament regime, and eventually resulted in the 
discontinuation of UNSCOM inspections after Operation 
Desert Fox. 
"'" Duelfer (2002). 
1
'
17 For an analysis of the Secretary General's visit ro Baghdad and its 
aftermath, see Krasno nnd Sutterlin (2003), pp. 122-35. 
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Chapter 8 
Remaining Disarmament Issues 
As previously argued, in 1997 and 1998 Iraq's cooperation 
with UNSCOM declined in tandem with the erosion of the 
consensus in the Security Council. Although some significant 
breakthroughs in verifying Iraq's past programmes did occur 
during those two years (e.g. VX weaponization), as Iraq's 
limited cooperation declined further it became increasingly 
difficult for UNSCOM to attempt to solve remaining 
issues."'As we saw in the third chapter, several unresolved 
disarmament issues that were defined as 'key issues' in 1997 
remained 'unaccounted for' when UNSCOM left Iraq in 1998. 
Rolf Ekeus has explained that even if Iraq had substantially 
disarmed, UNSCOM's task required 'to clean up all the 
weapons in Iraq. That meant that even if you didn't see any 
more weapons, that did not mean there were no more 
weapons.[ ... ] we had to understand their weapons programs, 
their decisions, the resources they had put into them, and 
where these items were. '209 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the so-called 'unresolved', 
'unverified' or 'unaccounted for' issues concerned the 
disposition of proscribed weapons and items that UNSCOM 
.w~ This argument differs from that of UNSCO.M's own historian, who 
argued that UNSCOJ\1's investigations were becoming increasingly effective. 
See e.g. Black (1999). 
2n~ Yale Oral History Project interview with EkCus (3), p. 19. 
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had not been able to fully account for, as well as questions 
about Iraq's proscribed programmes that UNSCOM had been 
unable to settle. Resolving these issues would require complete 
accounts of Iraq's proscribed capabilities, including Iraq's 
achievements in research and production, the intended 
military purpose of Iraq's CBW, and Iraq's associated 
procurement efforts. 
UNSCOM required adequate evidence to be able to fully 
verify Iraq's unilateral destruction of proscribed weapons and 
items that had taken place in 1991. Iraq would also have to 
provide evidence that the proscribed capabilities had indeed 
been destroyed, e.g. by enabling UNSCOM to verify that the 
CW production instruction manuals no longer existed. 
Verifying a full Iraqi explanation of the unresolved issues was 
necessary for UNSCOM's accounting for Iraq's complete 
disarmament, as required by Resolution 687, but was also 
important for the optimal design and targeting of UNSCOM's 
monitoring. UNSCOM's achievements in accounting for Iraq's 
disarmament were measured against the original disarmament 
objective defined in Resolution 687. Therefore, because of 
UNSCOM's inability to resolve the remaining issues, many 
considered that the UN regime was not able to achieve the 
disarmament objectives of Resolution 687. As previously 
argued, the increasing scepticism among some Security 
Council members concerning Iraq's intentions had 
implications for their confidence in the extent to which Iraq 
had actually disarmed of the proscribed weapons and 
capabilities. 
In the area of BW, the key remaining issue was to obtain 
and verify a complete account of Iraq's BW programme. In a 
report that was circulated in the Security Council in January 
1999, UNSCOM stated that the agency had 'no confidence' 
that all bulk biological agents had been destroyed, that no BW 
munitions or weapons remained in Iraq, or that a BW 
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capability did not still exist in Iraq at that point."" Thus, the 
unresolved issues prevented UNSCOM from even attempting 
to create a material balance in the BW area. 
In the area of CW, Iraq had also failed to provide a full 
account of its programme and capabilities. For example, 
UNSCOM's limited understanding of Iraq's CW research 
efforts that had not progressed beyond the research and 
development stage prevented the agency from obtaining a full 
understanding of the direction of Iraq's CW programme at the 
time of the Gulf War. Further, Iraq had not provided 
documents to UNSCOM that would enable the agency to 
verify Iraq's declarations concerning its procurement efforts. 
The material balance that UNSCOM presented in the report 
circulated in the Security Council in January 1999 was not 
fully verified. Iraq had provided insufficient evidence for some 
of the declarations that were included in the material balance 
information.211 Further, UNSCOM had not been able to fully 
verify Iraq's claims that thousands of chemical warheads had 
been used, lost or unilaterally destroyed. m Therefore, 
UNSCOM had not been able to fully verify that all of Iraq's 
proscribed weapons and items had in fact been destroyed by 
December 1998. 
Finally, in the area of proscribed BM Iraq had nor provided 
a complete and verifiable account of its programme and 
capabilities. UNSCOM could not verify that Iraq had 
destroyed all components and capabilities it claimed to have 
destroyed, partly because of difficulties in verifying Iraq's 
claims regarding the unilateral destruction of BM in 1991, 
and partly because evidence was absent in some areas.w For 
example, UNSCOM was unable to verify Iraq's claims 
concerning the number of missile warheads that had been 
!JO UNSCOlvf (1999), Section on disarmament. 
"' ASA special report (2002). 
'" Ibid. 
"'Ibid. 
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produced to carry CBW, the destruction of 50 conventional 
BM warheads and seven indigenously produced missiles. 214 In 
addition, UNSCOM was not able to verify Iraq's claim that 
key components for production of missiles had been 
unilaterally destroyed.215 
Why and how did the unresolved issues emerge? 
As was argued in chapter 3, there were several reasons why 
UNSCOM had not been able to account for all proscribed 
weapons, items and capabilities. First of all, it would be very 
difficulr, if not impossible, for any country to account for all 
details and aspects of research programmes running for 
decades, as well as the entire infrastructure used (and weapons 
pr'oduced).216 Iraq was the first case where this had been 
demanded. The case of Iraq stands in contrast to cases of 
CBW disarmament following regime change (e.g. Russia and 
South Africa in the early 1990s). As the Amorim Panel 
pointed out in 1999, any nationwide disarmament effort will 
inevitably result in some uncertainties.217 However, the 
underlying reason why so many unsolved issues arose was 
that the material balance approach to account for Iraq's 
complete disarmament presumed full cooperation, while Iraq's 
cooperation turned out to be selective and partial. 
Former UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter has argued that 
the effort to account for complete disarmament through a 
material balance approach resulted in the 'deadlock' that 
emerged berween Iraq and the Security Council in 1997-98.m 
The quantitative arms control approach was criticized on the 
basis that it lacked an identifiable end-point.219 Ritter 
'"!bid; UNSCOM (1999). 
"' ASA special report (2002); UNSCOM (1999). 
21
" Author's interview with Smidovich (2004). This point is rarely made in 
relation to the case of Iraq. 
117 Amorim Panel (1999). 
"'Ritter (2000). 
,., Ibid. 
DISii.RHING IRAQ? 109 
advocated a qualitative approach to account for Iraq's 
disarmament (focusing on capabilities rather than seeking to 
numerically account for each and every proscribed weapon 
and item) in order to overcome the 'deadlock' between Iraq, 
UNSCOM and the Security Council."'" However, a so-called 
qualitative approach would also face problems in identifying 
the limits of what ought to be verifiably disarmed. Another 
unavoidable problem is that it is nearly impossible for any 
country to provide complete declarations with supporting 
evidence for complex and comparrmentalized activities such as 
CBW programmes. Whether the disarmament accounting took 
a qualitative or a quantitative approach, 'unaccounted for' 
issues would probably still have emerged. 
However, when the effort to account for disarmament is 
hampered by obstruction and subversive efforts, coping with 
the resulting uncertainty ultimately becomes a political 
challenge. The pattern of Iraq's non-disclosure and deception 
made these uncertainties become highly concerning for 
Security Council members (primarily the United States and 
Britain) and required that UNSCOM had to critically assess 
Iraq's claims in the declarations. In the 'deadlock' that 
emerged over the outstanding disarmament issues in 1997-98, 
the Security Council's inability to agree on how to respond to 
the unresolved disarmament questions proved to be more 
problematic for the disarmament regime than the technical 
accounting approach. 
The implications of the remaining issues 
The unresolved issues were perceived as indicators of the level 
of cooperation and compliance Iraq offered in the 
disarmament process, and had significant implications for 
how Iraq's intentions were assessed by the Security Council 
members. The perceptions of Iraq's intentions regarding 
un Ibid. 
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disarmament of proscribed weapons and capabilities shaped 
how Security Council members assessed the risk that Iraq 
could have retained CBW and proscribed production 
capabilities. Because Iraq never made an official decision to 
abolish these capabilities, and had managed to retain 
proscribed weapons and items from UNSCOM prior to 1995, 
looming suspicions emerged that Iraq could have kept 
'unaccounted for' items and capabilities. 
Some of the unresolved issues had emerged from Iraqi 
declarations that had been found inaccurate and incomplete 
by UNSCOM, or from UNSCOM's discovery of documents 
years after Iraq claimed it had ceased to hide documents (after 
the Hussein Kamel defection). Iraq's deception tactics, the 
continuation of prohibited programmes for years after 
Resolution 687 was passed, and its selective cooperation were 
considered strong indications that the residual risks 
represented by the unresolved disarmament issues could 
become threats in the future. 
The resolution of the remaining issues was fundamentally 
important for the Security Council's confidence in Iraq's 
intentions, and how it assessed the risk that Iraq had retained 
proscribed weapons and items and would re-establish the 
proscribed capabilities. Notwithstanding UNSCOM's 
achievements, Iraq's decreasing cooperation and the erosion of 
the consensus in the Security Council made the settling of the 
unresolved questions increasingly unlikely.lll Iraq's 
demonstrated ability to successfully retain weapons and items 
meant that UNSCOM could not rule out the possibility that 
Iraq could still be undertaking such activities with the 
intention of retaining proscribed capabilities. The unresolved 
issues were interpreted as manifestations of Iraq's failure to 
comply with Resolution 687, and thus the risk that Iraq could 
111 This argument differs from the analysis of UNSCOM's official historian, 
see Black (1999). 
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have retained some proscribed items with the intention to 
rebuild CBW or proscribed missile capabilities at a later stage. 
The uncertainties that were associated with the unresolved 
issues in UNSCOM's accounting for Iraq's disarmament 
dramatically reduced the likelihood that the Security Council 
would decide that Iraq had completely disarmed. For 
UNSCOM, these uncertainties made it impossible to report 
that the accounting for Iraq's disarmament was complete in 
any sense. The Security Council was divided over the 
importance of these unresolved issues, and therefore failed to 
agree whether the outstanding disarmament questions posed a 
threat to international security. 
Years later, the 'unaccounted for' issues played a central 
role in the United States and Britain's casus belli, that Iraq 
could have retained or rebuilt proscribed weapons and 
capabilities, prior to the war in 2003. That said, the American 
and British threat assessments of the remaining disarmament 
issues cannot be explained in terms of UNSCOM's 
disarmament accounting, because of the changed political and 
security environment after 2001. 
Residual risks 
As discussed in chapter 5, the destruction of the physical 
components of Iraq's CBW and proscribed missile capabilities 
could not eliminate the risk that Iraq could rebuild similar 
infrastructures at a later stage. After December 1998 the 
residual risk was considered to consist of two main aspects. 
Firstly, that Iraq could re-establish proscribed BM 
development and production, and secondly, that Iraq could 
have retained CBW, missiles and parts of their infrastructure 
from before 1991.222 
UNSCOM never obtained evidence of an Iraqi decision to 
permanently discontinue the proscribed activities and abolish 
222 Lawrence Freedman (2004), p. 23-24. 
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CBW and proscribed BM capabilities."' When UNSCOM left 
Iraq there was a real risk that the CBW programmes could be 
'resuscitated', and that Iraq could reconstruct CBW and 
proscribed missile capabilities. Although the known 
components of Iraq's CBW and proscribed BM production 
infrastructure had been dismantled, Iraq's 'know-how' and 
dual-capable items remained. Without UN inspectors in rhe 
country, Iraq would be able to re-establish elements of its 
chemical or biological weapons programmes. 
Lawrence Freedman has distinguished between threat 
assessments prior to the war in 2003 that emphasized the risk 
that Iraq might intend to rebuild the destroyed capabilities, 
and others emphasizing the risk that Iraq could have retained 
items and resources."' If the 'unaccounted for' materials had 
actually been retained by Iraq, this could have included two 
proscribed BM and CBW in addition to equipment and 
'know-how' for producing proscribed BM and chemical and 
biological agents in a matter of months. 
However, as previously explained, if the biological and 
chemical weapons and material that had not been accounted 
for did still exist, it was unlikely that the majority of these 
weapons and materials could be used as effective weapons 
after 1998."·' At this point, the risk that Iraq's biological and 
chemical weapons programmes could be re-established was 
becoming more important as a potential threat to 
international security than the risk that old caches of CBW 
could have been retained. Because the majority of any caches 
remaining from 1991 would have been 'outdated', the 
possibility that weapons made before 1991 remained in Iraq 
was very unlikely to constitute an 'imminent threat' to 
international security."' 
"' UNSCOM (1999). 
"'Freedman (2004), p. 23-24. 
"' Ekeus (2003). 
'" Ibid. 
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Iraq already had some of the basic equipment and know-
how for chemical and biological agent production, and would 
probably be able to procure items to replace what UNSCOM 
had destroyed on the regional 'black market' .227 Indeed, the 
Iraq Survey Group reported in 2003 that Saddam Hussein had 
enquired about the time it would take to re-establish chemical 
weapons production, and had been reassured that this would 
,, h f be a matter of months.- T erefore, after 1998 the act that 
Iraq was able to develop some chemical and biological 
weapons without inspectors in the country could prove to be a 
far more threatening possibility for the region than caches of 
such weapons remaining from 1991."' However, Iraq's 
starting point for re-establishing the proscribed capabilities 
would have been substantially impaired by the combined 
impact of the disarmament and monitoring berween 1991 and 
1997. 
:z!: Author's interview with Spertzel (2004). 
"'Kay (2003). 
~· Ekeus (2003). 
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Chapter 9 
Condusion 
The disarmament regime established after the Gulf War in 
1991 appears to have been an attempt to apply a technical 
'fix' to solve a political problem. Resolution 687's demands 
that Iraq completely disarm of NBC weapons, capabilities and 
resources were in essence an attempt by the Security Council 
to remove the threat Iraq could pose to international peace 
and stability. Thus, the disarmament objectives were governed 
by political (rather than technical) concerns. 
Therefore, it seems paradoxical that several, including 
UNSCOM's own historian Step hen Black, conclude that the 
UN disarmament regime was a technical success, but a 
political failure.'30 It is undoubtedly true that the Security 
Council was ultimately responsible for UNSCOM's 
discontinuation after December 1998, as this violation of the 
ceasefire agreement enabled the Council to resort to 'all 
necessary means' to ensure that Iraq did not once again 
become a threat to international peace and security. It is also 
true that UNSCOM's substantial achievements in verifying 
Iraq's disarmament of CBW and proscribed BM are 
unequalled in the history of NBC disarmament. 
However, at a more general level, a sharp separation 
between the roles and performance on the technical and 
'
0
"' Black (1999). 
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political agencies appears problematic for three main reasons. 
First, this distinction does not accurately describe the 
disarmament regime dynamics. The disarmament regime 
divided the technical assessment and the political decisions 
whether Iraq was disarmed between UNSCOM and the 
Security Council. Iraq's systematic non-cooperation (including 
attempts to limit UNSCOM's capabilities and to discredit 
UNSCOM), and pressure from some Security Council 
members to change UNSCOM's reporting into becoming 
more like threat assessments, contributed to undermine the 
intended division between the technical and political levels of 
the disarmament regime. Despite the attempts to insulate 
UNSCOM from political influence in 1991, UNSCOM's 
actual role in the disarmament regime was undoubtedly 
politicised as a result of the agency's diplomatic efforts and 
influences from Iraq and Security Council members. 
Second, this distinction makes it difficult to explain how the 
political level of the disarmament regime shaped UNSCOM's 
working conditions and prospect of success. UNSCOM's 
effort to verify and monitor Iraq's disarmament was 
underpinned by the political relations between the Iraqi 
regime and the Secnrity Council. When the Security Council's 
consensus eroded, Iraqi cooperation decreased. It was 
increasingly difficult, particularly after 1997, for UNSCOM to 
maintain their technical capabilities without Iraqi cooperation 
or full backing from the Security Council. 
Third, when assessing the outcome of the disarmament 
regime it is ultimately futile to distinguish between the 
technical and political aspects. In 1997-98, it became 
increasingly clear that Iraq and Security Council members 
sought to politicise UNSCOM's technical role in the 
disarmament regime. The politicisation of UNSCOM's work 
was exploited by Iraq by driving a wedge between the political 
(Security Council) and technical (UNSCOM) elements of the 
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regime.231 This made it more difficult for UNSCOM to 
perform its role, and discredited the 'objective' element of the 
disarmament regime. Between 1997 and December 1998, 
Iraq's declining cooperation prevented UNSCOM, despite its 
technical brilliance, from resolving the remaining 
'unaccounted for' issues. 
One conclusion that can be drawn beyond the case of 
UNSCOM and Iraq is that while any effort to disarm a 
sovereign country of CBW and proscribed BM entails 
significant technical challenges, enforcing disarmament of 
proscribed weapons categories on a sovereign country in order 
to remove a threat to international security and stability is 
essentially a political endeavour. Therefore, political concerns 
will shape and influence the accounting and verification 
process and determination whether the objective has been 
achieved. 
Limitations of enforced disarmament 
Assessing what this disarmament regime actually achieved in 
Iraq between 1991 and December 1998 depends on how 
'complete disarmament' is defined. There are two different 
perspectives for assessing what the UN disarmament regime 
achieved in Iraq, namely technical assessments (accounting for 
destroyed items and assessing to what extent this accounting 
appears to be complete and accurate) and threat assessments 
(considering what Iraq might have retained in terms of 
capabilities and items as well as its policies and intentions). 
Charles Duelfer has argued that 'the permanent 
disarmament goals imposed on Iraq were out of proportion 
with the inspectors' tools and the rewards and punishments 
the Security Council could practically impose. The result was 
a political and military muddle with the inspectors caught in 
the middle.'232 Duelfer here points to the friction between the 
:oJI This process is illustrated in Krasno and Sutterlin (2003). 
'" Duelfer (2002). 
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disarmament objectives, whose achievement depended on full 
Iraqi cooperation, and UNSCOM's mandate to account for 
Iraq's complete disarmament with only limited Iraqi 
cooperation. Iraq's limited cooperation substantially reduced 
UNSCOM's prospect of verifying Iraq's complete 
disarmament, and introduced uncertainties concerning Iraq's 
intentions as well as the scope of Iraq's disarmament. 
UNSCOM's technical assessment of Iraq's disarmament 
faced a number of challenges in terms of how to define 
'complete' disarmament, and how to implement and measure 
this objective in technical and quantitative terms. After 
UNSCOM arrived in Iraq, it soon emerged that a direct 
challenge for its effort to obtain a material balance 
establishing the disposition of all proscribed weapons and 
items consisted of the uncertainties that emerged in the 
disarmament accounting. As long as Iraq did not offer 
complete declarations and evidence to back their statements, 
or enable UNSCOM to trust Iraq's declarations by 
demonstrating full commitment to complying with Resolution 
687, the agency would not be able to resolve the remaining 
disarmament uncertainties. 
Between 1991 and 1998 UNSCOM verified Iraq's 
destruction of large amounts of proscribed weapons and 
items. After the known elements of Iraq's proscribed 
infrastructures had been destroyed, Iraq would not be able to 
pose a military CBW threat to international security. 
Nonetheless, UNSCOM was never convinced that Iraq had 
disarmed completely of the proscribed weapons and 
capabilities, and had ample reason to doubt that Iraq had 
declared everything it ought to. Because UNSCOM could not 
verify all of Iraq's claims concerning disarmament, the 
agency's level of confidence concerning various aspects of the 
final material balance presented in 1999 varied significantly. 
Moreover, the disarmament regime's focus on destroying 
existing proscribed weapons and the physical infrastructure 
118 FORSV.,RSSTUDIER 4/2004 
used to produce such weapons left a residual risk that existing 
know-how and dual-capable resources could be used tu 
rebuild proscribed capabilities at a later stage. 
The Security Council's decision as to whether Iraq 
continued to pose a potential threat to international security 
in terms of proscribed weapons and capabilities would be 
based on a wider assessment of Iraq's intentions. Iraq's limited 
cooperation and subversive efforts made it seem highly 
unlikely that complete NBC disarmament could be achieved 
by this disarmament regime as long as Saddam Hussein 
remained ruler of Iraq. However, the risk that any residual 
NBC capabilities continued to pose could be managed by 
OMV, which could deter Iraq from re-establishing the 
proscribed capabilities. Thus, for the Security Council 
members who were concerned that Iraq could retain or 
rebuild proscribed weapons and capabilities the OMV system 
could serve as a 'risk management' tool that enabled the 
international community to contain Saddam Hussein's Iraq. 
However, the United States' policy to maintain sanctions as 
long as Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq, even if the disarmament 
obligations were satisfied, undermined UNSCOM's role as 
well as the credibility of the disarmament regime. The United 
States policy contradicted the objectives of the disarmament 
regime, antagonized other Security Council members and led 
to Iraq's increasing disengagement with the disarmament 
process in 1997-98. 
The uncertainties about the scope of Iraq's disarmament 
were considered unacceptable by some members of the 
Security Council, while for other members different political 
concerns became more important than the unresolved issues. 
These differing political and threat assessments created a 
division in the Security Council that fragmented the consensus 
that was required to continue the disarmament regime and 
UNSCOM's role within it. 
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The case of UNSCOM and Iraq illustrates that 
disarmament in terms of destruction of the physical 
components constituting the infrastructure for developing and 
producing CBW and BM of specific ranges is not essentially 
irreversible. Unless the disarmed country demonstrates that it 
is committed to enduring disarmament of these weapon 
categories, a residual risk (in terms of established know-how 
and available dual-capable resources) must be overseen and 
managed. 
Unresolved issues 
The reason why this disarmament regime left behind 
unresolved questions was partly political (the Iraqi regime's 
policies and the Security Council's differing threat 
assessments) and in part a consequence of the objective to 
destroy all of Iraq's proscribed weapons and infrastructures 
(based on a demand of complete cooperation). 
The emergence of 'unaccounted for' disarmament issues 
was unavoidable given Iraq's incomplete cooperation and 
UNSCOM's mandate to account for all weapons, items and 
activities that had been associated with Iraq's NBC 
programmes. However, the implications of the resulting 
uncertainties in relation to the final decision whether Iraq had 
disarmed was determined by the Security Council. 
In order to satisfy the Security Council that Iraq did not 
(and would not) pose a threat to international security, 
evidence of a political decision by the Iraqi regime to abolish 
the proscribed weapons and capabilities would be required. 
However, Iraq's non-compliance and subversive efforts led to 
the emergence of significant question marks about the scope 
of Iraq's disarmament and intentions in this area. The 
'unaccounted for' weapons and items included items that were 
necessary for re-establishing the destroyed infrastructures and 
developing proscribed CBW or missiles. The United States and 
Britain's most significant concern, namely Saddam Hussein's 
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intentions, could not be 'disarmed' by the UN regime. Iraq's 
refusal to enable UNSCOM to resolve the outstanding 
disarmament issues entrenched concerns that the Iraqi regime 
intended to rebuild the proscribed capabilities at a future 
point in time. 
The Iraqi regime's limited cooperation with UNSCOM, and 
the erosion of the Security Council's consensus, made it seem 
unlikely that this disarmament regime could successfully 
achieve and verify complete disarmament of proscribed BM 
and CBW in Iraq. As long as Iraq did not fully cooperate with 
UNSCOM, and the Security Council was divided on what 
would constitute an "end point' for this disarman1ent regime at 
which point sanctions would be lifted, the Council was 
unlikely to agree that Iraq had been completely disarmed and 
no longer posed a threat to international security. 
The implications of the unresolved disarmament issues for 
the premature ending of the disarmament regime illustrate the 
importance of how other countries perceive the credibility of 
the disarming country's commitment and cooperation with the 
disarmament process. In the case of UNSCOM and Iraq, the 
uncertainties that emerged in Security Council's assessments of 
Iraqi disarmament from the disarmament verification process 
reflected the various perceptions of Iraqi intentions. The threat 
assessments of the Security Council members were naturally 
influenced by their foreign policy concerns, because the 
question whether Iraq posed a threat to international security 
in terms of proscribed weapons and capabilities entailed far 
more than technical and numerical balances. 
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Appendix A 
RESOLUTION 687 (1991) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meeting, 
on 3 April 1991 
The Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) 
of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) 
of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) 
of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 
(1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 
1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 
October 1990, 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990, 678 (1990) 
of 29 November 1990 and 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 
Welcoming the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity and the return of its 
legitimate Government, 
Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of 
Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention expressed by the 
Member States cooperating with Kuwait under paragraph 2 of 
resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq 
to an end as soon as possible consistent with paragraph 8 of 
resolution 686 (1991), 
Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful 
intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait, 
Taking note of the letter sent by the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Iraq on 27 February 1991 and those sent pursuant 
to resolution 686 (1991), 
Noting that Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign 
States, signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 'Agreed Minutes 
Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq 
Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition 
and Related Matters', thereby recognizing formally the 
boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of 
DISJ.1Rl.JING IRAQ? 135 
islands, which were registered with the United Nations in 
accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United 
Nations and in which Iraq recognized the independence and 
complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait within its borders 
as specified and accepted in the letter of the Prime Minister of 
Iraq dated 21 July 1932, and as accepted by the Ruler of 
Kuwait in his letter dated 10 August 1932, 
Conscious of the need for demarcation of the said 
boundary, 
Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use 
weapons in violation of its obligations under the Geneva 
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 
June 1925, and of its prior use of chemical weapons and 
affirming that grave consequences would follow any further 
use by Iraq of such weapons, 
Recalling that Iraq has subscribed to the Declaration 
adopted by all States participating in the Conference of States 
Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested 
States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, establishing 
the objective of universal elimination of chemical and 
biological weapons, 
Recalling also that Iraq has signed the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972, 
Noting the importance of Iraq ratifying this Convention, 
Noting moreover the importance of all States adhering to this 
Convention and encouraging its forthcoming Review 
Conference to reinforce the authority, efficiency and universal 
scope of the convention, 
Stressing the importance of an early conclusion by the 
Conference on Disarmament of its work on a Convention on 
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the Universal Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and of 
universal adherence thereto, 
Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked 
attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in 
regard to such missiles located in Iraq, 
Concerned by the reports in the hands of Member States 
that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-
weapons programme contrary to its obligations under the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 
1968, 
Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-
weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East, 
Conscious of the threat that all weapons of mass destruction 
pose to peace and security in the area and of the need to work 
towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of 
such weapons, 
Conscious also of the objective of achieving balanced and 
comprehensive control of armaments in the region, 
Conscious further of the importance of achieving the 
objectives noted above using all available means, including a 
dialogue among the States of the region, 
Noting that resolution 686 (1991) marked the lifting of the 
measures imposed by resolution 661 (1990) in so far as they 
applied to Kuwait, 
Noting that despite the progress being made in fulfilling the 
obligations of resolution 686 (1991 ), many Kuwaiti and third 
country nationals are still not accounted for and property 
remains unreturned, 
Recalling the International Convention against the Taking 
of Hostages, opened for signature at New York on 18 
December 1979, which categorizes all acts of taking hostages 
as manifestations of international terrorism, 
Deploring threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to 
make use of terrorism against targets outside Iraq and the 
taking of hostages by Iraq, 
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Taking note with grave concern of the reports of the 
Secretary-General of 20 March 1991 and 28 March 1991, and 
conscious of the necessity to meet urgently the humanitarian 
needs in Kuwait and Iraq, 
Bearing in mind its objective of restoring international 
peace and security in the area as set out in recent resolutions 
of the Security Council, 
Conscious of the need to take the following measures acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
l. Affirms all thirteen resolutions noted above, except as 
expressly changed below to achieve the goals of this 
resolution, including a formal cease-fire; 
A 
2. Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability 
of the international boundary and the allocation of islands set 
out in the 'Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and 
the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly 
Relations, Recognition and Related Matters', signed by them 
in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 
1963 and registered with the United Nations and published by 
the United Nations in document 7063, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, 1964; 
3. Calls upon the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to 
make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the 
boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on appropriate 
material, including the map transmitted by Security Council 
document S/22412 and to report back to the Security Council 
within one month; 
4. Decides to guarantee the inviolability of the above-
mentioned international boundary and to take as appropriate 
all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations; 
B 
5. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with 
Iraq and Kuwait, to submit within three days to the Security 
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Council for its approval a plan for the immediate deployment 
of a United Nations observer unit to monitor the Khor 
Abdullah and a demilitarized zone, which is hereby 
established, extending ten kilometres into Iraq and five 
kilometres into Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the 
'Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the 
Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly 
Relations, Recognition and Related Matters' of 4 October 
1963; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence 
in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone; to observe any 
hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory 
of one State to the other; and for the Secretary-General to 
report regularly to the Security Council on the operations of 
the unit, and immediately if there are serious violations of the 
zone or potential threats to peace; 
6. Notes that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the 
Security Council of the completion of the deployment of the 
United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be 
established for the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in 
accordance with resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military 
presence in Iraq to an end consistent with resolution 686 
(1991); 
c 
7. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations 
under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in 
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 
June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, of 10 April 1972; 
8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the 
destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under 
international supervision, of: 
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(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of 
agents and all related subsystems and components and all 
research, development, support and manufacturing facilities; 
(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 
kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production 
facilities; 
9. Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, 
the following: 
(a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen 
days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration of 
the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in 
paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as 
specified below; 
(b) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the 
appropriate Governments and, where appropriate, with the 
Director-General of the World Health Organization, within 
forty-five days of the passage of the present resolution, shall 
develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a plan 
calling for the completion of the following acts within forty-
five days of such approval: 
(i) The forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry 
out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical 
and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the 
designation of any additional locations by the Special 
Commission itself; 
(ii) The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special 
Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, 
taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all 
items specified under paragraph 8 (a) above, including items 
at the additional locations designated by the Special 
Commission nnder paragraph 9 (b) (i) above and the 
destruction by Iraq, under the supervision of the Special 
Commission, of all its missile capabilities, including launchers, 
as specified under paragraph 8 (b) above; 
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(iii) The provision by the Special Commission of the 
assistance and cooperation to the Director-General of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency required in paragraphs 
12 and 13 below; 
10. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to 
use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in 
paragraphs 8 and 9 above and requests the Secretary-General, 
in consultation with the Special Commission, to develop a 
plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of 
Iraq's compliance with this paragraph, to be submitted to the 
Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty 
days of the passage of this resolution; 
11. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations 
under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons of 1 July 1968; 
12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to 
acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-
usable material or any subsystems or components or any 
research, development, support or manufacturing facilities 
related to the above; to submit to the Secretary-General and 
the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency within fifteen days of the adoption of the present 
resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types 
of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-
weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for 
custody and removal, of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special 
Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-
General discussed in paragraph 9 (b) above; to accept, in 
accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 
13 below, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, 
removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items 
specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 
13 below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification 
of its compliance with these undertakings; 
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13. Requests the Director-General of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, through the Secretary-General, with 
the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as 
provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General in paragraph 
9 (b) above, to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's 
nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and the 
designation of any additional locations by the Special 
Commission; to develop a plan for submission to the Security 
Council within forty-five days calling for the destruction, 
removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items 
listed in paragraph 12 above; to carry out the plan within 
forty-five days following approval by the Security Council; 
and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and 
obligations of Iraq under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, for the future ongoing 
monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with 
paragraph 12 above, including an inventory of all nuclear 
material in Iraq subject to the Agency's verification and 
inspections to confirm that Agency safeguards cover all 
relevant nuclear activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the 
Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty 
days of the passage of the present resolution; 
14. Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in 
paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution 
represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle 
East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all 
missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on 
chemical weapons; 
D 
15. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security 
Council on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all 
Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any 
property that Kuwait claims has not been returned or which 
has not been returned intact; 
E 
142 FOR$VARSSTUDIER 4/2004 
16. Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and 
obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will 
be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under 
international law for any direct loss, damage, including 
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, 
or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, 
as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait; 
17. Decides that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 
1990 repudiating its foreign debt are null and void, and 
demands that Iraq adhere scrupulously to all of its obligations 
concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt; 
18. Decides also to create a fund to pay compensation for 
claims that fall within paragraph 16 above and to establish a 
Commission that will administer the fund; 
19. Directs the Secretary-General to develop and present to 
the Security Council for decision, no later than thirty days 
following the adoption of the present resolution, 
recommendations for the fund to meet the requirement for the 
payment of claims established in accordance with paragraph 
18 above and for a programme to implement the decisions in 
paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 above, including: administration of 
the fund; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of 
Iraq's contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the 
value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products 
from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be suggested to the Council 
by the Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements 
of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity as assessed in 
conjunction with the international financial institutions taking 
into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the 
Iraqi economy; arrangements for ensuring that payments are 
made to the fund; the process by which funds will be allocated 
and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, 
listing claims and verifying their validity and resolving 
disputed claims in respect of Iraq's liability as specified in 
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paragraph 16 above; and the composition of the Commission 
designated above; 
F 
20. Decides, effective immediately, that the prohibitions 
against the sale or supply to Iraq of commodities or products, 
other than medicine and health supplies, and prohibitions 
against financial transactions related thereto contained in 
resolution 661 (1990) shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to 
the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 
(1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait or, 
with the approval of that Committee, under the simplified and 
accelerated 'no-objection' procedure, to materials and supplies 
for essential civilian needs as identified in the report of the 
Secretary-General dated 20 March 1991, and in any further 
findings of humanitarian need by the Committee; 
21. Decides that the Security Council shall review the 
provisions of paragraph 20 above every sixty days in the light 
of the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq, 
including the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the 
Security Council, for the purpose of determining whether to 
reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to therein; 
22. Decides that upon the approval by the Security Council 
of the programme called for in paragraph 19 above and upon 
Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions 
contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 above, the 
prohibitions against the import of commodities and products 
originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial 
transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 
(1990) shall have no further force or effect; 
23. Decides that, pending action by the Security Council 
under paragraph 22 above, the Security Council Committee 
established by resolution 661 (1990) shall be empowered to 
approve, when required to assure adequate financial resources 
on the part of Iraq to carry out the activities under paragraph 
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20 above, exceptions to the prohibition against the import of 
commodities and products originating in Iraq; 
24. Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) 
and subsequent related resolutions and until a further decision 
is taken by the Security Council, all States shall continue to 
prevent the sale or supply, or the promotion or facilitation of 
such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals, or from their 
territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of: 
(a) Arms and related materiel of all types, specifically 
including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms 
of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary 
forces, and spare parts and components and their means of 
production, for such equipment; 
(b) Items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 
above not otherwise covered above; 
(c) Technology under licensing or other transfer 
arrangements used in the production, utilization or stockpiling 
of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above; 
(d) Personnel or materials for training or technical support 
services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, 
maintenance or support of items specified in subparagraphs 
(a) and (b) above; 
25. Calls upon all States and international organizations to 
act strictly in accordance with paragraph 24 above, 
notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, 
licences or any other arrangements; 
26. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with 
appropriate Governments, to develop within sixty days, for 
the approval of the Security Council, guidelines to facilitate 
full international implementation of paragraphs 24 and 25 
above and paragraph 27 below, and to make them available 
to all States and to establish a procedure for updating these 
guidelines periodically; 
27. Calls upon all States to maintain such national controls 
and procedures and to take such other actions consistent with 
DISARMING IRAQ? 145 
the guidelines to be established by the Security Council under 
paragraph 26 above as may be necessary to ensure compliance 
with the terms of paragraph 24 above, and calls upon 
international organizations to take all appropriate steps to 
assist in ensuring such full compliance; 
28. Agrees to review its decisions in paragraphs 22, 23, 24 
and 25 above, except for the items specified and defined in 
paragraphs 8 and 12 above, on a regular basis and in any case 
one hundred and twenty days following passage of the present 
resolution, taking into acconnt Iraq's compliance with the 
resolution and general progress towards the control of 
armaments in the region; 
29. Decides that all States, including Iraq, shall take the 
necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the 
instance of the Government of Iraq, or of any person or body 
in Iraq, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of 
any such person or body, in connection with any contract or 
other transaction where its performance was affected by 
reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in 
resolution 661 (1990) and related resolutions; 
G 
30. Decides that, in furtherance of its commitment to 
facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country 
nationals, Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of 
such persons, facilitating the access of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross to all such persons wherever 
located or detained and facilitating the search by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross for those Kuwaiti 
and third conntry nationals still unaccounted for; 
31. Invites the International Committee of the Red Cross to 
keep the Secretary-General apprised as appropriate of all 
activities undertaken in connection \Vith facilitating the 
repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third conntry 
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nationals or their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 
1990; 
H 
32. Requires Iraq to inform the Security Council that it will 
not commit or support any act of international terrorism or 
allow any organization directed towards commission of such 
acts to operate within its territory and to condemn 
unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of 
terronsm; 
I 
33. Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the 
Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its 
acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is 
effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States 
cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 
(1990); 
34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such 
further steps as may be required for the implementation of the 
present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area. 
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Appendix B 
RESOLUTION 715 (1991) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3012th meeting, on 11 
October 1991 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April1991 and 
707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, and its other resolutions on 
this matter, 
Recalling in particular that under resolution 687 (1991) the 
Secretary-General and the Director General of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were requested to 
develop plans for future ongoing monitoring and verification, 
and to submit them to the Security Council for approval, 
Taking note of the report and note of the Secretary-General 
(S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev.1), transmitting the plans 
submitted by the Secretary-General and the Director General 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, 
1. Approves, in accordance with the provisions of 
resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and the present resolution, 
the plans submitted by the Secretary-General and the Director 
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev.1); 
2. Decides that the Special Commission shall carry out the 
plan submitted by the Secretary-General (S/22871/Rev.1), as 
well as continuing to discharge its other responsibilities under 
resolutions 687 (1991), 699 (1991) and 707 (1991) and 
performing such other functions as are conferred upon it 
under the present resolution; 
3. Requests the Director General of the International 
Aromic Energy Agency to carry out, with the assistance and 
cooperation of the Special Commission, the plan submitted by 
him (S/22872/Rev.l) and to continue to discharge his other 
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responsibilities under resolutions 687 (1991), 699 (1991) and 
707 (1991); 
4. Decides that the Special Commission, in the exercise of 
its responsibilities as a subsidiary organ of the Security 
Council, shall: 
(a) Continue to have the responsibility for designating 
additional locations for inspection and overflights; 
(b) Continue to render assistance and cooperation to the 
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
by providing him by mutual agreement with the necessary 
special expertise and logistical, informational and other 
operational support for the carrying out of the plan submitted 
by him; 
(c) Perform such other functions, in cooperation in the 
nuclear field with the Director General of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, as may be necessary to coordinate 
activities under the plans approved by the present resolution, 
including making use of commonly available services and 
information to the fullest extent possible, in order to achieve 
maximum efficiency and optimum use of resources; 
5. Demands that Iraq meet unconditionally all its 
obligations under the plans approved by the present resolution 
and cooperate fully with the Special Commission and the 
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
in carrying out the plans; 
6. Decides to encourage the maximum assistance, in cash 
and in kind, from all Member States to support the Special 
Commission and the Director General of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency in carrying out their activities under 
the plans approved by the present resolution, without 
prejudice to Iraq's liability for the full costs of such activities; 
7. Requests the Committee established under resolution 661 
(1990), the Special Commission and the Director General of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency to develop in 
cooperation a mechanism for monitoring any future sales or 
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supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the 
implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and 
other relevant resolutions, including the present resolution 
and the plans approved hereunder; 
8. Requests the Secretary-General and the Director General 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency to submit to the 
Security Council reports on the implementation of the plans 
approved by the present resolution, when requested by the 
Security Council and in any event at least every six months 
after the adoption of this resolution; 
9. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
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After the Gulf War in 1991, the United Nations 
Security Council's 'ceasefire resolution' obliged Iraq to 
destroy all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
associated infrastructures. The United Nations Special 
Commission (UNSCOM) was established to oversee 
Iraq's disarmament. However, Iraq's partial 
cooperation led to the emergence of several unresolved 
disarmament questions concerning Iraq's intentions in 
the area of WMD. After operation Desert Fox in 1998, 
the disarmament regime fell apart. 
UNSCOM is now considered a major success of 
the United Nations. The case of UNSCOM and Iraq 
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